Recent Work on the Moral Argument, Part II

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In this second installment of exciting recent work in moral apologetics, we asked Dr. Mark Linville to offer a quick summary of what he’s been up to. He does really excellent work, and MoralApologetics.com is always happy to direct people to his substantive contributions. In his own words here is that summary:

I titled my essay, “Darwin, Duties, and the Demiurge.”  I begin by comparing the “evolutionary debunking arguments” of C. S. Lewis and Alex Rosenberg.  No two thinkers could be further apart in their views of the nature of the universe, but they agree on two fundamental points: A consistent naturalism entails either moral subjectivism or nihilism, and most naturalists are not consistent, as they seek ways of avoiding the full--and repugnant--implications of their worldview.  Rosenberg embraces both naturalism and its repugnant implications. Lewis rejects both.

In contrast to both Lewis and Rosenberg, I argue not that naturalism entails or requires some variety of moral non-realism, but that moral realism--the idea that some acts really are right or wrong--does not find a good “fit” on that worldview.  And where they argue that the consistent naturalist would embrace some variety of moral non-realism, I instead advance an epistemological argument to the effect that the consistent naturalist is a moral skeptic. Where a naturalist of Rosenberg’s stripe will reject any teleological explanation for what Rosenberg calls “core morality”--basically, the common sense moral beliefs that are widely distributed--the theist thinks that human moral faculties are designed for the purpose of discerning moral truth.  “Theism thus provides underpinnings for the expectation that the human moral sense is capable of discerning moral truth.”

After recounting a general Darwinian “genealogy of morals,” I consider some objections to the sort of argument that I advance.  I assess Louise Antony’s direct replies to my earlier work. Perhaps the heart of her critique is that despite the origins of our moral faculties, we are still in a position to evaluate moral claims and beliefs by appeal to “reason and evidence.”  And she cites an important recent article by Roger White (“You Just Believe That Because….”) in support of her argument. The heart of my reply is that certain of our most basic moral convictions, such as Chesterton’s example that “Babies should not be strangled,” is not had by any inference of reason.  We do not reason to this as a conclusion, but we reason with it as we evaluate other moral claims.  And it is not as though babies have the empirically discernible property of not-to-be-strangledness stamped under their bonnets, giving us empirical evidence for the belief.  Rather, the best evidence for that conviction is it seeming to us to be true, and self-evidently so.  And it is this very seeming that is undercut on Antony’s naturalism.

I then turn to Erik Wielenberg’s interesting and ingenious attempt at avoiding evolutionary debunking arguments by appeal to a “third factor” involved in the explanation of human moral beliefs.  His aim is to challenge the debunker’s claim that even if there were objective values the naturalist would not be in a position to know them.  The core of his argument, I think, is that if there are rights, and if such rights supervene upon the possession of reason, and if believing that there are rights requires the possession of reason, then it would appear that our evolution, aiming only at fitness, has also guided us to truth.  My main reply to Wielenberg invokes George Santayana’s critique of the young Bertrand Russell’s early embrace of both moral realism--a Moral Platonism similar to Wielenberg’s--and naturalism.  The heart of Santayana’s argument--what one commentator on Santayana calls his “most telling criticism”--is what might be dubbed the demiurge argument.  Santayana argued that, unlike Plato’s scheme, Russell’s Platonic Good “is not a power,” and so cannot be thought to influence the course of nature. And so there is a great gulf fixed between those Platonic precepts and whatever shape the world takes, with the result of a Platonism “stultified and eviscerated.”  In a world in which “man is a product of causes which had no prevision of the end they were achieving,” there is no reason to expect that the moral convictions of evolved rational creatures would be informed in any way by the moral declarations in the Platonic Empyrean.  What is missing, then, is someone or something that can fill the role of Plato’s demiurge, and the theist has the perfect candidate.

Other Relevant Recent Work

“God is Necessary for Morality” is my main essay in my printed “debate” with Louise Antony in Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion, 2nd edition, eds., Michael Peterson and Raymond VanArragon (Blackwell, 2019).  Antony and I also exchange brief replies to each other’s main essays.

 
 

“Moral Argument” in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy of Religion eds., Stewart Goetz and Charles Taliaferro (Wiley-Blackwell).  I believe this comes out this year.

“Respect for Persons Makes Right Acts Right” is my main essay in my printed “debate” with Alastair Norcross (who defends Act Utilitarianism) in Steven B. Cowan, Problems in Value Theory (Bloomsbury, 2020).  I offer a brief critique of Divine Command Theory here along the same lines as my critiques of several other ethical theories (along the way to defending a Kantian respect for persons principle). Perhaps of at least indirect relevance is my fairly extensive ("Chestertonian") critique of Alex Rosenberg's Scientism in "A Defence of Armchair Philosophy: G. K. Chesterton and the Pretensions of Scientism" in An Unexpected Journal (December, 2019)--online and Amazon hard copy.  (This journal is put together by several graduates of the HBU apologetics program.)

 
 

We appreciate Dr. Linville doing that for us! Be on the lookout for all those exciting essays to come. In our next installment we’ll take a look at two younger scholars doing exciting work on aspects of moral apologetics, namely, Suan Sonna and Adam Johnson.

New Developments in Moral Apologetics, Part I

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We here at MoralApologetics.com are enthusiastic to note some of the most exciting new work on the moral argument. Convinced a real movement is afoot, we wish to make a brief chronicle of these developments and bolster those interested in joining this expansive project to feel the freedom and encouragement to do so. This is the first of several posts that will do just that. We want to provide community for folks interested in exploring the moral argument, fleshing out new variants, defending versions against objections, extending the argument beyond generic theism to something distinctively Christian, and other exciting ventures besides. This is indeed a job for a community.

To this end, my wife and I are moving from Liberty University to Houston Baptist University this summer, and as part of our move we get to start a Center for Moral Apologetics. This website will be part of that Center and thus begin to fall under the auspices of HBU. In time we hope the Center is able to provide scholarships, degree programs, conferences, lectureships, and even an endowed Chair in Moral Apologetics. We hope it can become the central hub for this real and exciting emerging movement of thinkers (from a variety of disciplines) devoted to thinking through aspects of the moral argument for God’s existence and essential goodness.

What follows is by no means an exhaustive list of new developments. Those pursuing other new directions are encouraged to let us know; we would relish the chance to put a highlight on your work and give you an opportunity here at the site to share your work with others interested in this exciting topic. It’s a great time to be a moral apologist; lots of cutting-edge work is to be done, and done in a supportive, encouraging community for the glory of God. Some of the folks whose work mentioned below are younger scholars, while others are veterans in the field. What’s especially exciting to us is the growing number of a wide variety of scholars who feel compelled to contribute something to this vitally important conversation. In this first post, I’ll make mention of Jordan Hampton, Chan Arnett, and Paul Moser.

Jordan Hampton is doing us all a valuable service by intentionally interviewing a number of moral apologists at his website CrashCourseApologetics—including Paul Copan, Matthew Flannagan, metaethicist extraordinaire Terence Cuneo, Bobby Conway, and my wife and me. Kudos to Jordan for his generosity, interest, investment of time and energy, and his marvelous spirit. A dear friend, Chan Arnett, founder of Faithful Apologetics, is another big moral argument enthusiast. His excitement about apologetics generally and moral apologetics particularly is veritably infectious and always such an encouragement.

So let’s get the ball rolling! First a small disclaimer: as we make mention of various folks doing work in moral apologetics broadly construed, we are not thereby suggesting that we agree with everything that such thinkers say; we undoubtedly resonate with at least some of it, but it’s not our intention to say we agree with all of it. But we needn’t agree with all of it to see such folks as important allies in our quest and part of this community.

I recently watched an interview Loyola professor of philosophy Dr. Paul Moser gave in a podcast to atheist Tom Jump. Moser didn’t disappoint in his brilliance as an epistemologist. What I found especially interesting about his insights from religious epistemology was how infused they were with moral concerns. It dawned on me as I listened how relevant much of what he had to say is to the enterprise of moral apologetics. The podcast was an exploration of whether there’s evidence for God’s existence, and Moser wished to emphasize that we need to begin by clarifying our salient conception of God. For Moser, the key to divine identity is that “God” is a title, and it’s a title that requires of the inhabitant of the office holder of deity to be worthy of worship. What this means is that any evidence we find must be fitting to God’s character construed in such a way.

This makes Moser skeptical of, say, first cause or design arguments, because by themselves they don’t lend themselves to an inference to a personal being or morally perfect agent. What does being worthy of worship involve? Moser argues nobody shows this better than Jesus did, but rather than looking to Jesus, most apologists gravitate instead to abstract arguments and miss the point, generating a “bundle of bad arguments.” The relevant evidence to consider should pertain to God’s moral character and what that involves for us. We should ask: Who am I as an inquirer about God asking for evidence for God’s existence? What do we expect the evidence to be, and, importantly, what are we going to do with it? If it’s just about becoming puffed up or accusing others of irrationality, we’re not yet ready to receive the evidence, in which case a God worthy of the title will hide from us. Divine hiding is a theme rampant throughout the Bible. As Moser put it, we shouldn’t expect God to be trivially obvious. 

Then Moser began sharing ideas that touch significantly on moral apologetics. As for where to look for the relevant evidence, he argued that it should be in the deepest center of human moral agency: the moral conscience. Our conscience challenges us to renounce selfishness and become oriented toward others. The place where God self-manifests and gives evidence of divine reality is in the conscience. Sounding a bit like John Henry Newman, Moser argued that the conscience is indicative of fundamental reality because of the way it works so concretely. To be a personal agent is to be an intentional agent, setting goals and the like. The important question about conscience is whether its evidence indicates intentional agency? Since conscience can lead people who are responsive to it away from selfishness and can deepen concern for others in a way that’s purposive, he argued, there’s reason to think it’s deeply personal. We’re moved not by abstract principles but by something intentional, something personal, an intrinsically morally perfect being worthy of worship. So the relevant evidence to consider is to be found in human moral experience where people are morally challenged in a way that’s indicative of God’s character, but there’s a side of us that doesn’t want to find the evidence. So what’s required is moral candor and a willingness to comply.

At this point epistemology becomes morally robust. Moser admitted that secular ethical theories are possible, but he thought they leave unanswered a central question of Plato’s Republic, namely, is the just life really worthwhile? Can it be sustained? Will there be ultimate justice and a balancing of the scales? In a purely secular universe the answer is no, Russell’s dissembling transparent bravado in “A Free Man’s Worship” notwithstanding. Plato was asking whether the morally good life is sustainable, vindicatable, commendable—redolent with lasting meaning of the sort monotheists talk about. Put that way, a naturalist view is at a serious disadvantage for lack of requisite resources. The challenge, Moser argued, is whether we can be candid enough to leave room for such evidence. To give it honest attention, to be morally attentive and responsive. This is no time to be casual or sanguine; conscience constantly challenges us to be responsive to moral intrusion. Are we willing to go through a change of priorities? The phenomenology of conscience gives us the tools for an abductive case for a personal and worship-worthy God at work speaking to us powerfully through our conscience, if we have but the ears to hear it.

That’s just a thumb nail sketch of what Moser had to say. The link to the discussion is above; we encourage you listen to it for yourself. Moser’s gentle demeanor and patience with Tom’s questions is a model for us all to emulate. 

In the next several posts we’ll talk about a great many more scholars involved in doing important and fresh work on one aspect or other of the moral argument (whether or not that’s how they’d characterize it). If you follow along, I think you’ll see ever more clearly how this really is the work of an emerging and dynamic community.