Does the Incommensurability of Prudential and Impartial rationality avoid the dualism of Practical Reason?

Editor’s note: This article was originally posted at MandM. It has been posted here with permission of author.

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I have been discussing the dualism of practical reason. As I understand it, this is an inference from three premises:

[1] We always have most reason to do what is morally required

[2] An act is morally required if and only if it is impartially demanded: demanded by rules justified from a perspective of impartial benevolence.

 [3] If there are cases where, what is impartially demanded of a person, is an action contrary to their long-term self-interest, then the strongest reasons do not always favour what is impartially demanded.

The conclusion: unless we assume that requirements of self-interest never substantially conflict with impartial demands, we can only coherently affirm [1] and [2]. Seeing [1] is a plausible thesis about the authority of requirements, and [2] is a plausible thesis about their content.  Our fundamental moral intuitions about morality cannot be reconciled.

One response to this argument is to deny [3]. This involves contending that impartial requirements are overriding: If impartial and prudential requirements clash, the former always take precedence. In my last post, I mentioned an argument made by Stephen Layman against this contention.   Layman asks us to consider the case of Ms Poore;

Stephen Layman

Ms. Poore has lived many years in grinding poverty. She is not starving, but has only the bare necessities. She has tried very hard to get ahead by hard work, but nothing has come of her efforts. An opportunity to steal a large sum of money arises. If Ms. Poore steals the money and invests it wisely, she can obtain many desirable things her poverty has denied her: cure for a painful (but nonfatal) medical condition, a well-balanced diet, decent housing, adequate heat in the winter, health insurance, new career opportunities through education, etc. Moreover, if she steals the money, her chances of being caught are very low, and she knows this. She is also aware that the person who owns the money is very wealthy and will not be greatly harmed by the theft. Let us add that Ms. Poore rationally believes that if she fails to steal the money, she will likely live in poverty for the remainder of her life. In short, Ms. Poore faces the choice of stealing the money or living in grinding poverty the rest of her life. In such a case, I think it would be morally wrong for Ms. Poore to steal the money; and yet, assuming there is no God and no life after death, failing to steal the money will likely deny her a large measure of personal fulfillment, i.e., a large measure of what is in her long-term best interests[1].

Layman takes this case to illustrate that impartial requirements are not overriding.  If there are cases where impartial demands require us to make a great sacrifice that confers relatively modest benefits on others, the strongest reasons do not support complying with impartial demands.[2] 

Peter Bryne has criticised Layman’s example. He writes:

Layman’s way of approaching his moral argument suggests the following picture: rational agents are aware of a variety of reasons for action. They see prudential reasons vying with moral reasons. They measure whether moral reasons for doing something outweigh prudential reasons for not doing it, and they follow that set of reasons which is stronger overall. Now it is time to ask the question “From what standpoint does Layman’s rational agent weigh or measure reasons for action?[3] 

Bryne thinks this is question raises an important challenge:

The unclarity in the language of weighing reasons for action, and of judging which reasons are stronger than others, lies in the fact that such language implies a common, neutral means of measuring the reasons. The very contrast, however, between morality and self-interest suggests that there can be no such means. The agent is faced with a choice between points of view and perspectives. From within a point of view or perspective, there can be weighing. What remains a mystery is how any agent could measure the relative strengths of the two kinds of consideration from neither the moral or prudential point of view but from a neutral standpoint.[4]

Bryne’s criticism seems to be this. Layman example imagines an agent “weighing” impartial reasons against prudential reasons against each other and attempting to answer the question as to which reasons are stronger or take precedence. This implies there is some rational perspective, which is neutral between prudence and impartial demands, which can weigh and adjudicate them in a conflict. 

Bryne thinks this is misleading. The clash between prudential and impartial reasons involves a clash between requirements justified by incommensurable points of “points of view” or “perspectives”. These points of view are perspectives on what interests to take into account and how much weight to give them. The impartial point of view is a perspective that takes into account everyone’s interests and forms a conclusion based on giving these interests equal weight and consideration. From this point of view, you always have decisive reasons to do what is impartially required. By contrast, the prudential point of view is a view that only gives takes into account the interest of the individual agent and gives equal weight to the future and past interests of this individual agent. From this perspective, you should always act in your long-term self-interest. 

Because these are differing perspectives on what interests to take into account and how much weight to give conflicting interests, there can be no question-begging way of weighing the conclusions of each procedure against each other. You can weigh reasons for and against actions in accord with one or more of these perspectives. You can have allegiance to one or both perspectives, and weigh from that perspective. One can also give up allegiance to one perspective in favour of another. But, when they clash, you cannot accept both perspectives simultaneously and weigh them against each other. 

I am inclined to think Byrne’s response here misses the point. Consider how Ms Poore’s case appears on Bryne’s analysis. Ms. Poore “faces the choice of stealing the money or living in grinding poverty the rest of her life”. However, you analyse this; she still has to choose what to do in this situation; she must act one way or the other. In Bryne’s terms, we can ask Which perspective should she use in making the decision and weighing the relevant factors. Which point of view should she give allegiance to? Which should she give up allegiance to? Bryne’s analysis seems to imply there is no reason one can give for or against either answer. There is no “rational” or “neutral point of view” by which she can make this choice. The implication is that Ms Poore does not have stronger or weightier reasons to do what is impartially required. This isn’t because prudential reasons sometimes outweigh or trump impartial reasons, but because one cannot coherently claim one is weightier than the other without begging the very question at issue. 

Concerns about the dualism of practical reason are concerns about a specific sort of practical dilemma. Suppose it is not always in one’s long-term self-interest to act according to impartial demands. This will mean impartial demands sometimes come into conflict with prudential requirements. When they do, we face the question: What reason is there to act impartially, rather than in one’s self-interest. What reason do we have for assuming that impartial demands are always stronger or weightier than prudential requirements when the two clash? The concern is that no answer to this question is forthcoming. If impartial and prudential requirements cannot be weighed against each other, then its hard to see how the former can always be weightier or take precedence in a clash. If they are incommensurable, we cannot have reasons for preferring one to the other.

Several commentators argue that this is precisely Sidgwick’s point when he agonised over the dualism of practical reason[5]. Note the argument Sidgwick gives for [3]

[U]nless the egoist affirms, implicitly or explicitly, that his own greatest happiness is not merely •the rational ultimate end for himself but •a part of universal good; and he can avoid the ‘proof’ of utilitarianism by declining to affirm this. Common sense won’t let him deny that the distinction between himself and any other person is real and fundamental; so it puts him in a position to think: ‘I am concerned with the quality of my existence as an individual in a fundamentally important sense in which I am not concerned with the quality of the existence of anyone else’; and I don’t see how it can be proved that this distinction ought not to be taken as fundamental in fixing the ultimate goal of an individual’s rational action… If an egoist isn’t moved by what I have called proof, the only way of arguing him into aiming at everyone’s happiness is to show that this gives him his best chance of greatest happiness for himself. And even if he admits that the principle of rational benevolence is self-evident, he may still hold •that it is irrational for him to sacrifice his own happiness to any other end;[6] 

Here, Sidgwick imagines an “egoist”: someone who has “given allegiance” to the prudential point of view and weighs reasons in accord with this perspective. This egoist discovers that an impartial point of view would prohibit some action. Does the egoist have any reason to heed this prohibition? Sidgwick argues that, unless it can be shown that doing so is in his interest, the answer is no. From the egoist’s “perspective” or “point of view,” the effects of the action on his long-term interests is the only factor that carries weight in the decision. Providing does not implicitly give allegiance to an impartial point of view, or he is willing to give up any allegiance he does have to it; he will have no reason to do what is impartially required. Nor does he have any question-begging reason why he should switch allegiance to this point of view. 

On this interpretation: the dualism of practical reason is the problem that impartial and prudential requirements are requirements justified from incommensurable points of view. Because human beings recognise both prudential and impartial reasons for acting in their practical reasoning, they implicitly give allegiance to both. This is not a problem if their requirements are consistent. But if they contradict each other, we will be rationally committed both to both doing and not doing the same action. The incommensurability of these perspectives means there is no rational basis for resolving the contradiction in favour of impartiality. Sidgwick writes:

[W]here we find a conflict between self-interest and duty, practical reason, being divided against itself, would cease to be a motive on either side. The conflict would have to be decided by which of two groups of non-rational impulses had more force. So we have this: •The harmony of duty and self-interest is a hypothesis that is required if we are to avoid a basic contradiction in one chief part of our thought.[7]

We can put it this way: Either prudential and impartial reasons are commensurable, or they are incommensurable. If they are commensurable, then when these requirements clash, we will need some reason for thinking that impartial reasons are always weightier. The Ms Poore case suggests this is not the case. By contrast, suppose that prudential and impartial requirements are incommensurable perspectives, and we cannot weigh them against each other. If they clash, we will have to choose which perspective to follow, and we will have no reason to follow one or the other. It will simply be an arbitrary act of allegiance. Either way, we will lack decisive reasons always to do what is impartiality required.

[1] C. Stephen Layman “God and the Moral Order” Faith and Philosophy, 23 (2006): 307

[2] Layman, “God and the Moral Order” 308

[3] Peter Bryne “God and the Moral Order: A Reply to Layman” Faith and Philosophy, 23:2 (2006): 201

[4] Bryne, “God and the Moral Order: A Reply to Layman” 206-207:

[5] See for example, Derek Parfit On What Matters (Volume 1) (Oxford: Oxford University Press : 2011) 130-134. See also Francesco Orsi, “The Dualism of the Practical Reason: Some Interpretations and Responses” Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics, 10:2 (2008): 25-26

[6] Henry Sidgwick, The Method of Ethics, 242 available at https://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/sidgwick1874.pdf accessed 20/3/21

[7] Henry Sidgwick, The Method of Ethics, 284 available at https://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/sidgwick1874.pdf accessed 20/3/21

Lord's Supper Meditation: Holy Boasting

A Twilight Musing  

The idea of "boasting in the Lord" (as in I Cor. 1:31) seems a bit contradictory at first, but we should note that it is quoted by Paul from an Old Testament source (Jer. 9:24) to conclude a discourse on how God uses the weak and despised things of this world to show His glorious power.  So it is that "Christ crucified [is] a stumbling block to Jews and foolishness to Gentiles, but to those whom God has called . . . the power of God and the wisdom of God" (I Cor. 1:23-24).  So this "boasting in the Lord" is a way of exulting in what God has done in us, but with the focus on Him, not on ourselves.

"Holy boasting," then, is an antidote to human boasting. As in most cases in which God forbids a behavior, He offers a contrasting alternative that, if followed, will shed the light of God on the forbidden action and drive it out by showing it to be shabby and worthless.  So instead of fleshly boasting which spotlights our puny achievements or our pumped-up status in order to convince others that we deserve their admiration and approval, we focus on the flawless reality of what God has gloriously done, in spite of our weakness and lack of merit. 

Such "holy boasting" is particularly appropriate to our partaking of the Lord's Supper.  We "boast in the cross" (Gal. 6:14), as Paul says, so that in partaking of the Lord's Supper, we relinquish any pretense to our own righteousness and in loving wonder acknowledge Jesus' death that alone can make us righteous before God.

We are thereby released from the inherent insecurity of depending on our own efforts to be successful, which can be achieved only through the continual maintaining of an image and an illusion.  As we "boast" in what God has done with our weakness, we rejoice in the undeserved reflected glory that we share with Christ as His bride.  In embracing what He has done with our weakness, we rejoice at being crucified with Him, because that experience is the avenue to life.

Let us then glory in the cross, which is the unlikely instrument through which God has accomplished our salvation.  He has transformed the broken body and the shed blood of Christ into life eternal for us.

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Dr. Elton Higgs was a faculty member in the English department of the University of Michigan-Dearborn from 1965-2001. Having retired from UM-D as Prof. of English in 2001, he now lives with his wife in Jackson, MI. He has published scholarly articles on Chaucer, Langland, the Pearl Poet, Shakespeare, and Milton. Recently, Dr. Higgs has self-published a collection of his poetry called Probing Eyes: Poems of a Lifetime, 1959-2019, as well as a book inspired by The Screwtape Letters, called The Ichabod Letters, available as an e-book from Moral Apologetics. (Ed.: Dr. Higgs was the most important mentor during undergrad for the creator of this website, and his influence was inestimable.

Forsaken: An open letter to American military veterans as Afghanistan falls

Sunday, August 15th, 2021

Dear fellow Operation Enduring Freedom veteran,

This letter is a “buddy check,” as we call it – the act of reaching out to make sure someone else’s head is still above water. I have turned off the news and hope you have, too. We do not need to see more photos of places we walked, or of our equipment being taken over by terrorists, or of desperate people falling to their deaths as they attempt to hold onto the outside of departing freedom flights. We know what Afghanistan looks like, what it smells like. We were there.

As I watch Afghan towns and provinces tumble to the Taliban like so many dominoes, I vacillate between anger and depression. I feel hopeless. I am resentful that of the thousands of images I keep in my mind, our presence there is now forever symbolized by another Chinook evacuating an embassy. I am in despair over a war that has marked my entire adult life (I received my offer of appointment to the U.S. Naval Academy on September 11th, 2001) ending with ghost faces, names, and places rolling through our collective mind. While we achieved our stated objective of denying a terrorist safe haven, preventing another 9/11 every single day for 20 years, the general public does not understand the importance of that objective, or in any way see victory. I feel isolated from everyone who did not serve in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) or a war like ours.

In short, I grieve. We grieve together.

The chaos in which OEF is ending constitutes to many of us a violation of what we believe to be moral obligations. We feel obligation to uphold ideals of freedom and victory, to defend what is right and just. We feel obligation to our brothers and sisters in arms, especially those lost or injured. We feel obligation to our families, left alone so we could go overseas. Most of us report feeling obligation to protect the innocent; not to the extent that we remain in a state of foreign conflict indefinitely, but sufficient to orchestrate our departure from the battlefield in such a way, and on such a timeline, that honors the realities of the situation on the ground and does its best to protect those not a part of atrocities. In a “low-intensity conflict,” as scholars call our 20 years in Afghanistan, troops became more significantly enmeshed with locals than do fighters in more compressed wars. As a result, we all have memories of innocents, usually women and children. They are being slaughtered now, and we know it, and it hurts.

People removed from the war tend to get caught up in political conversations about whether we should have been there in the first place, but once there, none of that matters. This is our war, now, and the outcome is personal. I have spoken with more than a few OEF veterans this week who say in no uncertain terms that they hold the present slaughter of Afghan nationals by the Taliban to be our fault for a seemingly unplanned withdrawal; they use words like “disgrace” to describe the blood they see on our hands. Foreign area officers and linguists who spent years becoming equipped to work in Afghan culture use terms like “absolute guilt” as they offer apologies to the Afghan people on social media. Personal texts are peppered with shared pictures of children we once knew and pictures of us with our interpreters, with comments asking if we think they are still alive. Some of us are hearing directly from our Aghan counterparts; their fear for themselves and their families is thick and comes to rest directly on our hearts.[1]

So, what can we do?

“You have to focus on the cross,” my father told me this morning over breakfast. He has fought in many places, all over the world.

“I know,” I replied. “But it doesn’t help with the sadness or the anger.”

“No, it doesn’t,” he answered. “But focusing on the cross keeps your head above water. Remember how your grandfather fought, first World War II, then Korea, then Vietnam? I’ll never forget 1975. The day the U.S. left Saigon was a bad day. I saw in him every emotion you describe, and the faces of the dead in his eyes. Keep your eyes on the cross, even if that’s the only part of you above water.”

The thing about my father’s advice, frustratingly simple though it may seem at first receipt, is that it is true. From our current position treading water in vast pools of mental, emotional, and spiritual pain, if we look at the cross, we see a man. That man has been tortured, abused, literally crucified. That man, from his own point of view, has been forsaken, and his last human words on this earth are to ask why.

Why would an all-knowing God allow for such pain to be inflicted upon his only begotten Son? Perhaps, perhaps for such a time as this. Perhaps so we know we are not alone. Perhaps so we can walk behind one who knows our sorrows, who will carry them for us. One who, under the weight of pain greater than we can imagine or could bear, rose again. One who felt alone.

Here is the truth, stripped of all pretense, from one veteran to another – the sight and knowledge of Jesus Christ, who felt forsaken, is cause for hope. The might and glory of our Lord is such that he knew we would at times feel abandoned by him, and his son took on the weight of even that pain. You may feel lost now. You may doubt. You may want to scream at God. So, scream. Sob. Curse. Beg. He’s heard it before. Bring all to the feet of him who felt forsaken, as we do now.

Keep your eyes on the cross. Christ’s story does not end there, and neither does ours.

With prayers for Afghanistan, the Afghan people, our allies, our families, and ourselves,

Jan

P.S.  Don’t know what to do? Hydrate. Circle the wagons, watch each other, watch yourselves. Pick up the phone when a brother or sister calls, answer the texts, hit the gym, sleep the best you can, read great books, eat fresh food.

Onward. For the next mission - Joshua 24:15.

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[1] I believe that what we are experiencing now, standing together as veterans in common experience of Afghanistan one last time, is a group occurrence of moral injury. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) defines moral injury this way: “In traumatic or unusually stressful circumstances, people may perpetrate, fail to prevent, or witness events that contradict deeply held moral beliefs and expectations… Moral injury is the distressing psychological, behavioral, social, and sometimes spiritual aftermath of exposure to such events.”  "Guilt" and "shame" are key words in nearly any working definition of moral injury. Moral injury is something apart from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and must include consideration of the spiritual and the ethical to heal. More to come on this topic in another article.

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Jan Shultis is a Naval Academy graduate, author of two books, and Associate Editor at moralapologetics.com who plans to pursue her DMin at Houston Baptist University. After 14 years in uniform serving around the U.S. and in Afghanistan, she founded a faith-based non-profit focused on veterans, law enforcement, first responders, and families that supports warriors in need throughout Texas, with a special focus on ministry in local courts and jails. Jan brings to the Moral Apologetics team additional professional experience in biotechnology, public relations, and ethics curriculum development. Jan shares that she is extremely excited to spearhead the Center’s innovative exploration of the organic connections between moral apologetics and moral injury, including but not limited to military veterans. She is local to Houston and looks forward to contributing to the Center’s robust on-campus presence at HBU

Book Review of Wade Mullen’s Something’s Not Right: Decoding the Hidden Tactics of Abuse and Freeing Yourself from Its Power

In a dark time in my life, I found myself angered, hurt, and heartbroken by the type of experiences that I had encountered in a previous institution. Like many people, I had been hurt in church before. But I never experienced as much difficulty in finding healing. Drs. David and Marybeth Baggett were God-sent to help me find a pathway to healing. They ministered to me and expressed their concern for the hurt that I was feeling. Marybeth mentioned a couple of books that I might find interesting. One was a work by Wade Mullen entitled Something’s Not Right: Decoding the Hidden Tactics of Abuse and Freeing Yourself from Its Power. The book proved extremely beneficial to me as it explained the hurt that I had experienced. I realized that I was not alone. For the remainder of this article, I would like to provide a review of Mullen’s work. First, I will offer a summary of Something’s Not Right, then I will identify the strengths of the book, before concluding with some personal reflections.

Summary

Wade Mullen writes for those who have suffered from institutional abuse and for those who think they may be currently experiencing it. Mullen writes from his own dealings with it, having suffered from his own encounters with institutional abuse. Mullen reflects that he knew that something was not right (hence, the title of the book), but neither he nor his family had suffered from sexual or physical abuse.[1] Yet it was clear to him that he and his family had suffered some form of abuse. He later realized that he had suffered from institutional abuse—that is, suffering from the oppressive and bullying nature of organizations that permit narcissistic dictators to emotionally harm those under their care.

By Mullen, Wade

Mullen draws his argument from the field of impression management and the research of Erving Goffman. Goffman defines impression management as the process of “creating, influencing, or manipulating an image held by an audience.”[2] Making a comparison to a stage play, the author contends that impression management tactics take on an abusive and unethical nature when “the front-stage persona is used to hide truths that ought not to be hidden.”[3] The actor(s) adjust the performance when problems arise to keep the audience engaged but never attempt to resolve the inner problems, or actors, causing the abuse. Everything becomes much more about image than character.

Mullen further inquires, why do institutions and individuals, though they may have begun with good intentions, operate in such a manner? The answer is simple: power. Mullen contends, “The chief desire of abusive individuals and organizations is to attain or retain power—most often the kind of power gained and held firm through deception.” Through the remainder of the book, Mullen describes the tactics by which abusers use impression management to attain or retain their power. He identifies the use of charm, dismantling the victim’s internal and external world, intimidation used to silence victims, walls of defense,[4] disingenuous apologies to save the image of the abuser or institution,[5] and demonstrations.[6]

Strengths

Mullen’s book is a much-needed resource due to the rising number of institutional cases of abuse. His book features numerous strengths. But for the sake of space, we will consider three. First, Mullen provides compelling examples of institutional abuse. Some may wonder whether institutional abuse even, exists, but, in a clear and winsome fashion, Something’s Not Right exposes the problem of institutional abuse and offers examples to show its malevolent practice. In the pages of Mullen’s book, the reader may find oneself reflecting on personal examples of the very practices that Mullen describes. The book is relevant for those who have suffered from abuse in the church, universities, businesses, and other institutions. Earnest readers will be left with a clear depiction of the reality of institutional abuse.

Second, Mullen exposes the methodology of institutional abuse. The illustration of a stage play is quite telling as it covers the array of organizations that may be guilty of abuse. Quite to the point, institutions that permit abuse do not desire to expose the interior problems. Some may conclude that the institution does not want to expose skeletons in the closet. Yet when those skeletons are permitted to continue to harm, they need to be exposed if institutional healing is to take place, the abuse is to be eliminated, and the victims healed. Abusive institutions are more concerned with image than character.

Finally, the book diagnoses the root moral problem behind institutional abuse. Simply put, the assignment of primacy to self-serving power drives people within institutions to abuse individuals. Such power also drives institutions to permit such behavior as the institution desires to perpetuate its influence in the community. Unrestrained power is not concerned with a utilitarian ethic, neither is it concerned with the wellbeing of others. Rather, Mullen shows that those whose primary or only ethical standard is acquisition and consolidation of power will only be concerned with what others can do to help retain their status or position. Readers should be driven to promote transparency within the establishments with which they are associated. Institutions that have nothing to hide will not mind sharing their internal workings.

Reflections

Two critiques can be offered at this point. First, it is possible that genuine repentance could come while trying to salvage the institution in question. While I fully agree with Mullen’s concerns about institutions trying to sweep former events under the rug, I also believe there comes a point that the institution and person must move on from events that occurred. While the abusive situation should never be forgotten, rehashing scandals of the past can prove harmful to the person who was victimized. Particularly for those suffering from PTSD, continual discussions of past harms and abuses can prove detrimental to the victims, just as much as not discussing them enough. Delicacy and discernment are the needed antidote.

For instance, with the greatest of intentions, I continued talking to a couple who suffered from mental impediments about safeguarding themselves from people who tried to take advantage of them financially. They had previously been persuaded to buy a computer that was well out of their price range and, quite honestly, was not worth the price. While my intentions were noble, my continued discussions brought back the pain of their victimization. Thus, an institution needs to do everything possible to make amends for abusive behaviors and resolve systemic problems permitting abuse to occur. But there might come a point at which further dwelling on past wrongdoings reaches a point of diminishing return.

Second, Mullen’s work raises the matter of forgiveness. It is not his main focus here, although he does end the book with a section on it. It obviously is a highly important matter, as Mullen would be the first to agree. One issue concerning forgiveness is what happens if the guilty party never asks for forgiveness? An abuse victim’s exit from the situation of abuse is important, but what about this matter of forgiveness when there isn’t repentance? Such a scenario is, sadly, not uncommon. Abusers more often make excuses for their abusive behaviors than come clean, repent, and ask for forgiveness.

What can an abused person do spiritually if reconciliation with the abuser doesn’t happen? The biblical answer is that a forgiving stance is still required. Jesus pleaded for the forgiveness of those who were crucifying him (Luke 23:34). This kind of forgiveness does not mean that the abuser and abusive systems are never held accountable for his or her actions. Abusive institutional and systemic systems must be corrected and reformed, as evidenced by Jesus’s overturning of the tables in the temple. Again, forgiveness most certainly does not indicate that a person remains in an ongoing abusive situation. Remember, Jesus told the disciples to wipe the dust off their feet while leaving a town that rejects them (Luke 10:10-11).

Still, forgiveness is vitally important, and it is just as much about one’s walk with God and peaceful mindset as it is for the guilty party. As someone once said, “Holding a grudge is like trying to poison another by drinking the poison yourself.”

In the context of chronic and acidic abuse, however, it is also important to remember that abusers, especially within religious contexts, are often adept at exploiting the rhetoric of forgiveness and “moving on” to conceal their culpability, avoid accountability, and sometimes even perpetuate abuse. So while we must endeavor to retain a forgiving stance, forgiving others as we have been forgiven, we must also resist disingenuous efforts by abusers to wrap the cloak of religious legitimacy around efforts to evade responsibility and continue mistreatment under a new, and perniciously religious, guise.

Conclusion

Wade Mullen’s book Something’s Not Right is a must-read. I give the book five stars out of five. The book effectively illustrates the abusive tactics found in unhealthy organizations while also recognizing the importance of spiritual healing. More cases of institutional abuse are being revealed in churches, universities, and denominations. To counter the abuse, one needs to first recognize unhealthy patterns found within institutions as well as practices by abusive individuals. Mullen’s work will prove to be an essential tool in doing just that. Regardless of whether you have suffered abuse, suspect abuse, or desire to know more about institutional abuse, Mullen’s book is a tour de force on the topic. I would suggest supplementing Something’s Not Right with Diane Langberg’s work Redeeming Power. Additionally, I would also recommend Os Guinness's book God in the Dark along with In Search of a Confident Faith, co-written by J. P. Moreland and Klaus Issler, to learn more about overcoming barriers to faith after being victimized by abusive power structures.

About the Author

Brian G. Chilton is the founder of BellatorChristi.com, the host of The Bellator Christi Podcast, the author of the Layman’s Manual on Christian Apologetics, and a Ph.D. Candidate of the Theology and Apologetics program at Liberty University. He received his Master of Divinity in Theology from Liberty University (with high distinction); his Bachelor of Science in Religious Studies and Philosophy from Gardner-Webb University (with honors); and received certification in Christian Apologetics from Biola University. Brian is a member of the Evangelical Theological Society and the Evangelical Philosophical Society. Brian has served in pastoral ministry for nearly 20 years and currently serves as a clinical chaplain, an editor for the Eleutheria Journal, and an Associate Editor for MoralApologetics.com.

https://www.amazon.com/Laymans-Manual-Christian-Apologetics-Essentials/dp/1532697104

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[1] Wade Mullen, Something’s Not Right: Decoding the Hidden Tactics of Abuse and Freeing Yourself from Its Power (Carol Stream, IL: Tyndale Momentum, 2020), 1.

[2] Ibid., 9; Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (New York, NY: Anchor, 2008).

[3] Mullen, Something’s Not Right, 12.

[4] The four walls of defense include denials, excuses, justifications, and comparisons. Ibid., 102.

[5] This includes the unwillingness to condemn the abuser’s actions, appeasing the situation, excusing behavior, justifying one’s own actions by claiming that the victim in some ways bears the burden of guilt, self-promotion, and sympathy. Ibid., 149.

[6] Demonstrations include actions that does only what is necessary to survive that scandal rather than making amends for the abuse that occurred. Ibid., 162.

What Makes Something Morally Good or Bad? Why a Trinitarian Metaethic Better Explains Morality (Part 5)

Editor’s note: Adam Johnson has graciously allowed us to republish his video series, “What Makes Something Morally Good or Bad?” Find the original post here.

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Adam believes that his Trinitarian Moral Theory is a better explanation for the existence of objective morality than Erik Wielenberg’s theory of Godless Normative Realism. Why does Adam think his theory is better? The Trinitarian Moral Theory contains five elements that are important for moral truth to be objectively real that Wielenberg’s theory lacks. First, the Trinitarian Moral Theory posits the existence of an ultimate moral standard, God, to which humans can be compared. Second, it offers an objective purpose for human beings that contextualizes morality. Third, it provides a social context for moral obligation, since moral obligations arise out of social relationships. Fourth, it recognizes a personal authority at the head of the chain of moral obligation to whom human beings are obligated. Finally, it grounds all moral truth in an ultimate foundation. Taken together, these features of the Trinitarian Moral Theory make it a more plausible explanation for objective morality than Wielenberg’s theory.

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Adam Lloyd Johnson serves as a university campus missionary with Ratio Christi. He also teaches classes for Midwestern Baptist Theological Seminary and spends one month each year living and teaching at Rhineland Theological Seminary in Wölmersen, Germany. Adam received his PhD in Theological Studies with an emphasis in Philosophy of Religion from Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary in 2020.

What Makes Something Morally Good or Bad? Adam Lloyd Johnson’s Trinitarian Moral Theory (Part 4)

Editor’s note: Adam Johnson has graciously allowed us to republish his video series, “What Makes Something Morally Good or Bad?” Find the original post here.

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Adam has proposed his own metaethical theory, a theory about where morality comes from, which builds on the foundation of Divine Command Theory. He calls it the “Trinitarian Moral Theory” because it holds that morality is based on the loving relationships within God between the members of the Trinity. God is love, and His love is the source of moral values and duties. Adam believes that his Trinitarian Moral Theory, which is uniquely Christian, is the best explanation for the existence of objective morality. He thinks that the Trinitarian Moral Theory is true for several reasons. First of all, his theory centers on the Trinity, which is a key aspect of who God is. In addition, focusing on the loving relationships of the Trinity explains why the meaning of life is personal loving relationships, it explains how we can be morally good by resembling God, it explains the purpose of God’s commands, and it explains why there are different types of commands from God.

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Adam Lloyd Johnson serves as a university campus missionary with Ratio Christi. He also teaches classes for Midwestern Baptist Theological Seminary and spends one month each year living and teaching at Rhineland Theological Seminary in Wölmersen, Germany. Adam received his PhD in Theological Studies with an emphasis in Philosophy of Religion from Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary in 2020.

Meditation on Lord's Supper: The Glory of His Appearing

A Twilight Musing

In partaking of the Lord’s Supper each week, we are proclaiming the Lord's death "until He comes" (I Cor. 1; 26).   There has always been much speculation about how and when that will happen, and about what will happen between that appearing and the creation of "a new heavens and a new earth in which righteousness dwells" (II Pet. 3:13).  Two things we do know, however:   First, that Jesus' coming again will have been preceded by centuries of testimony to His death and resurrection, so that as many as possible can participate in the wonderful consummation of being "caught up . . . in the clouds to meet the Lord in the air" to "be with the Lord forever" (I Thess. 4:17).

The public response to the film "The Passion of the Christ" has brought the horrors of Jesus' death once more to the fore for many people; and, indeed, we need to be aware of the enormity of what He suffered.  But at the same time, we need to realize that no suffering is an end within itself, and that Jesus invites us to share in the joy of being brought through suffering to the completeness of redemption which will be experienced at His coming again in all His glory, when He will fulfill His promise to receive His disciples unto Himself (John 14:3). 

The coming of the Lord will end the need for Christ's disciples to celebrate His death, because when Jesus comes again, the object of that death will have been fully accomplished.  Just as Jesus's death was swallowed up in the victory of His glorious resurrection, so will ours.

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Dr. Elton Higgs was a faculty member in the English department of the University of Michigan-Dearborn from 1965-2001. Having retired from UM-D as Prof. of English in 2001, he now lives with his wife in Jackson, MI. He has published scholarly articles on Chaucer, Langland, the Pearl Poet, Shakespeare, and Milton. Recently, Dr. Higgs has self-published a collection of his poetry called Probing Eyes: Poems of a Lifetime, 1959-2019, as well as a book inspired by The Screwtape Letters, called The Ichabod Letters, available as an e-book from Moral Apologetics. (Ed.: Dr. Higgs was the most important mentor during undergrad for the creator of this website, and his influence was inestimable.

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The Deeper Source of Religion: Passional Reason in William James’s Writings

Introduction: Encountering Truth

            Pilate asked Jesus, “What is truth?”[1] This is no simple question. Given the gravity of the moment in which it was asked, and to whom it was directed, Pilate’s question strikes at the very heart of humanity’s encounter with God. Some answer that truth is an outcome, the product of a logical process of considering a given situation’s evidence. Some say that truth is an encounter, whereby a person’s passional nature is the means by which circumstances are experienced and volitional conclusions are drawn. Is it possible that between the two—between reason and passion—truth is to be found as a result of utilizing both one’s passions and reason? The following research considers this possibility through an expository examination of the works of American philosopher William James (1842-1910), specifically considering aspects of his The Will to Believe, and The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature.[2] Three questions provide the framework for this investigation: 1) What is passional reason?; 2) What are examples of passional reason in the writings of William James?; and 3) What is the significance of James’s passional reason for religious epistemology? Research findings will suggest that James’s emphasis on the role of the passional nature provides a view of religious beliefs as both reasonably and passionally derived.

What is Passional Reason?

            To lay the groundwork for the discussion of James’s thought regarding the role of the passional aspects of human nature in forming religious beliefs it is helpful to begin with a definition of passional reason. Drawing upon the work of Wainwright, passional reason may be defined as the culmination of human reason’s investigation of proofs, history, and other logically arguable facts regarding religious truth claims, and the affective component of the human heart regarding such rational concerns that accepts them and recognizes their role in developing religious belief.[3] Wainwright explains,

This view was once a Christian commonplace; reason is capable of knowing God on the basis of evidence—but only when one’s cognitive faculties are rightly disposed. It should be distinguished from two other views that have dominated modern thought. The first claims that God can be known by ‘objective reason,’ that is, by an understanding that systematically excludes passion, desire, and emotion from the process of reasoning. The other insists that God can be known only ‘subjectively,’ or by the heart. . . . [Passional reason] steers between these two extremes. It places a high value on proofs, arguments, and inferences yet also believes a properly disposed heart is needed to see their force.[4]

In this explanation, Wainwright brings together both objective and subjective components to form a center ground for faith formation, the ground of passional reason.

            This concept of passional reason draws upon various aspects of the Christian tradition, including Calvin (with his Augustinian influence) and Aquinas. Calvin emphasizes the necessity of the Holy Spirit in confirming the authority of Scripture, and Aquinas teaches that even though “there is good evidence for the divine origin of Christian teaching . . . [it is not] sufficient to compel assent without the inward movement of a will grounded in a ‘supernatural principle.’”[5] Thus both Calvin and Aquinas, while making their arguments for Christianity utilizing proofs and evidences of various types, clearly highlight the role of affective, non-discursively derived conclusions relative to the formation of religious belief. This is passional reason, where reason (i.e., the mind) and the passions (i.e., the heart) synergize to cultivate religious beliefs.

What are Examples of Passional Reason in the Writings of William James?

            Moving on from this definition of passional reason, the investigation turns to the thought of William James, seeking to find how passional reason contributes to his understanding of the formation of religious beliefs. As a preface to the following quotes and the ensuing discussion, it is worth noting that interpretations of James vary from, on the one hand, those who think James does not accept religious beliefs as anything more than individual predilections that serve some ultimately personal need and have no connection, necessarily or actually, to any metaphysical reality; and, on the other hand, those who argue that James did, while recognizing the individual usefulness of religious beliefs, also affirm that such beliefs were metaphysically real and not only could but should be believed.[6] Whichever view one takes of James’s ultimate intention does not necessarily detract from the discussion below, insofar as the issue under consideration is how James understood the role of passional reason in cultivating religious beliefs, not the ultimate veracity of such beliefs.

            Four quotes from James are now considered. The first two are from The Will to Believe, an address to the Philosophical Clubs at Yale and Brown Universities in 1896. The last two are from The Varieties of Religious Belief: A Study in Human Nature, a work borne of James’s delivery of the Gifford Lectures on Natural Religion at the University of Edinburgh beginning in 1900. The presentation of these four quotes is an attempt to demonstrate what may be described as a “Jamesian Justification for Passional Reason,” which, though far from exhaustive regarding his thought on the topic, do, as the comments given after each quote will attempt to show, reveal the centrality of passional reason in James’s work.

            Quote One: “Our passional nature must, and lawfully may, decide an option between propositions, whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its nature be decided on intellectual grounds.”[7] Notice in this quote that James attributes to the passional nature the role of final decider in certain matters of belief, such that the evidence as reasonably considered may bring someone to the precipice of belief, but only the passional nature can and may let them take the step into belief. In taking this approach to passion and reason, James, according to Fuller’s estimation, “deftly pull[s] the philosophical rug out from under those committed to a modernist faith in the ability of the scientific method to usher humanity into the domain of universal truths and intellectual certainties. . . . His understanding of religious belief steer[s] a defensible middle course between naive credulity and agnostic skepticism.”[8] The conclusion that may be drawn from this first quote by James is that not only the intellect, but the whole person, is required in order to make choices regarding what to believe.

Quote Two: “I have said, and now repeat it, that not only as a matter of fact do we find our passional nature influencing us in our opinions, but that there are some options between opinions in which this influence must be regarded both as an inevitable and as a lawful determinant of our choice.”[9] While similar to the fist quote by James, the key distinction in this second quote is James’s conclusion that is it not only permissible to allow passional reason to guide in forming one’s beliefs, but that the use of passional reason may be “inevitable;” more than a choice, passional reason is a requirement in certain instances. Wainwright remarks that, for James, “all conceptualizations, including scientific ones, are simply abstractions from the richness of concrete experience. The ‘personal point of view’ is thus essential.”[10] James, as this second quote demonstrates, recognizes passional reason as a universally constitutive element in belief; it is much more than a subjective option for a few.

Quote Three: “I do believe that feeling is the deeper source of religion, and that philosophic and theological formulas are secondary products, like translations of a text into another tongue.”[11] In this quote, James identifies the passional nature (i.e., “feeling”) as primary, whereas more rational considerations are secondary. His use of an analogy from language reveals that James views the passional as the vital language for religious experience, and the rational as its expression in the language of the intellect. As Croce explains, in this way James “distinguishes religion lived at first hand, which would include direct personal encounter with spiritual forces, from religion at second hand, based on traditions derived from those first hand experiences.”[12] Thus in this third quote from James there is a sense in which he views passional reason as paradigmatic for properly evaluating all religious conclusions; passional reason becomes a lens through which religious truth formulations are derived and evaluated.

            Quote Four: “In all sad sincerity I think we must conclude that the attempt to demonstrate by purely intellectual processes the truth of the deliverances of direct religious experience is absolutely hopeless.”[13] The context in which James makes this statement is his discussion of the various proofs for God’s existence presented by Aquinas and others; it is important to note, therefore, that he is not dismissing the value of proofs, per se, but acknowledging that they are not, in themselves, sufficient to the task. Just as a person made in the image of God is both reasonable and passional, so arguments for the existence of God must be more than reasonable; the passional element is indispensable. Is it possible, as Wainwright surmises, that James’s point of critique is not that proofs for the existence of God do not establish certainty, but that the passional element should be considered, along with the intellectual element, as part of a broader definition of proofs?[14] This fourth quote by James certainly leaves open the possibility that this is so; passion and intellect combine in James to make the case that passional reason is the best arbiter for religious belief.

            As this brief expository analysis demonstrates, James certainly gives a fundamental, if not primary, role to the passional elements of human nature in the formation of religious belief. However, whether or not James’s conclusions about passional reason are epistemically helpful is another matter. Although far short of a full critique of James’s religious epistemology, the next section considers one positive and one negative aspect of his thought.

What is the Significance of James’s Passional Reason for Religious Epistemology?

Briefly considered, there are two aspects of James’s passional reason of significance to religious epistemology; one is positive, and one is negative. Positively, James attempts to engage the total person in the matter of faith formation, rather than focusing exclusively on the rational and evidentiary aspects, or on the subjective and experiential aspects. In biblical parlance, there is a sense in which James encourages the formation of religious belief utilizing one’s heart, soul, mind, and strength; with the whole being.[15] In an era of radical materialism and scientism, which bring with them a diminution of any philosophical metaphysic, James’s perspective can provide a helpful corrective and balance.

However, given James’s radical empiricism and its attendant emphasis of the nature of belief as dependent on currently observable facts (be they experiential or otherwise), and his commitment to human experience as the final test of truth, James implicitly opposes the primacy of theological dogma and its necessary authority in matters of faith and practice.[16] While James may allow a place for dogma in forming religious beliefs, there is no absolute sense in which dogma provides the objective standard by which all religious matters are to be evaluated. Yes, passional reason impacts faith formation, but unless there is a final standard of truth as divinely revealed through Scripture and Tradition, then the creature, rather than the Creator, becomes the determiner of reality.

Conclusion

William James’s articulation of the role of passional reason in forming religious belief provides a seminal contribution to discussions of faith, in general, and religious epistemology, in particular. The preceding research considered this contribution of James by initially defining passional reason, then identifying and expounding examples of passional reason in James’s writings, and finally by critically evaluating the positive and negative aspects of James’s approach. Research suggests that, with correctives regarding the role of dogma in faith formation, James’s conclusions about the interplay of the rational and passional offer helpful insights for the interdependent areas of philosophy and religion.

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Bibliography

Aquinas, Thomas. The Summa Theologica. New York: Benziger, 1947.

Calvin, John. Institutes of the Christian Religion. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1957.

Corbett, Robert. “The Will to Believe: An Outline.” St. Louis: Webster University, 1980.

Accessed 1 December 2016. http://faculty.webster.edu/corbetre/philosophy/misc/james.html.

Croce, Paul. “Spilt Mysticism: William James’s Democratization of Religion.” William James

Studies 9, (July 2012): 3-26. 

Elwell, Walter A., Ed. Evangelical Dictionary of Theology. 2nd ed. Grand Rapids: Baker, 2001.

Fuller, Robert C. "'The Will to Believe': A Centennial Reflection." Journal of the American

Academy of Religion 64, no. 3 (September 1996): 633-650. 

James, William. The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature. South

Australia: eBooks@Adelaide, 2009. Accessed 25 November 2016. https://csrs.nd.edu/assets/59930/williams_1902.pdf.

------. The Will to Believe. Accessed 2 December 2016.

http://norm.unet.brandeis.edu/~teuber/James_The_Will_to_Believe.pdf.

Smith, John E. Purpose and Thought: The Meaning of Pragmatism. New Haven: Yale University

Press, 1978.

Wainwright, William J. Reason and the Heart: A Prolegomenon to a Critique of Passional

Reason. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995.

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[1] John 18:38. Unless otherwise noted, all Scripture quotations are taken from The Holy Bible, New King James Version (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 1982).

[2] William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature (South Australia: eBooks@Adelaide, 2009); and The Will to Believe, http://norm.unet.brandeis.edu/~teuber/James_The_Will_to_Believe.pdf.

[3] William J. Wainwright, Reason and the Heart: A Prolegomenon to a Critique of Passional Reason (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), 3-4.

[4] Ibid., 3. Italics in original.

[5] Ibid., 4. Wainwright’s reference to Calvin is from John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1957), vol. I, book I, chap. 7, sec. 4; the reference to Aquinas is from Thomas Aquinas, The Summa Theologica (New York: Benziger, 1947), vol. 2, part II-II, quest. 6, art. I.

[6] An example of the former evaluation of James is John E. Smith, Purpose and Thought: The Meaning of Pragmatism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978). An example of the latter evaluation of James is Wainwright, Reason and the Heart, 84-107.

[7] James, The Will to Believe, sect. IV.

[8] Robert C. Fuller, “’The Will to Believe’: A Centennial Reflection,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 64, no. 3 (September 1996): 634.

[9] James, The Will to Believe, sect. VIII.

[10] Wainwright, Reason and the Heart, 93.

[11] James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, 327.

[12] Paul Croce, “Spilt Mysticism: William James’s Democratization of Religion,” William James Studies 9, (July 2012), 4.

[13] James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, 344.

[14] See Wainwright, Reason and the Heart, 1-6.

[15] See Luke 10:27.

[16] R. J. VanderMolen, “Pragmatism,” in the Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, 2nd ed., Walter A. Elwell, ed. (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2001), 945-946.

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T. J. Gentry is the Executive Editor of MoralApologetics.com, the Senior Minister at First Christian Church of West Frankfort, IL, and the Co-founder of Good Reasons Apologetics. T. J. has been in Christian ministry since 1984, having served as an itinerant evangelist, youth minister, church planter, pastoral counselor, and Army chaplain. He is the author of numerous books and peer-reviewed articles, including Pulpit Apologist: The Vital Link between Preaching and Apologetics (Wipf and Stock, 2020), You Shall Be My Witnesses: Reflections on Sharing the Gospel (Illative House, 2018), and two forthcoming works published by Moral Apologetics Press: Leaving Calvinism, Finding Grace, and A Moral Way: Aquinas and the Good God. T. J. is a Clinical Pastoral Education Supervisor, holding board-certification as a Pastoral Counselor and a Chaplain. He is a graduate of Southern Illinois University (BA in Political Science), Luther Rice College and Seminary (MA in Apologetics), Holy Apostles College and Seminary (MA in Philosophy), Liberty University (MAR in Church Ministries, MDiv in Chaplaincy, ThM in Theology), Carolina University (DMin in Pastoral Counseling, PhD in Leadership, PhD in Biblical Studies), and the United States Army Chaplain School (Basic and Advanced Courses). He is currently completing his PhD in Theology at North-West University, Potchefstroom, South Africa (2021), his PhD in Theology and Apologetics at Liberty University (2022), and his PhD in Philosophy of Religion at Southern Evangelical Seminary (2024). T. J. married Amy in 1995, and they are blessed with three daughters and two sons. T. J.’s writing and other projects may be viewed at TJGentry.com.

Shame, Deserved and Undeserved

Whereas guilt reveals that we have morally transgressed, shame pertains more to who we are, not just what we have done. And so shame can be particularly damaging if we allow it to detract from recognizing the value we have in God, which it can all too easily do. If we become convinced that we are useless, that our lives are pointless, that we as people lack value, it becomes exponentially harder to see ourselves as creations of God with infinite dignity and value and worth. The topic of shame is thus vitally important for moral apologists to think about and understand.

A temptation is to think that all shame is bad—nothing but a toxic emotion. Whereas guilt might be fine, shame is thought to just saddle us with needless negative emotional baggage. Victims of abuse may feel great shame over what happened to them, even though they did nothing wrong. That is undeserved shame, and the problem is not theirs. It’s all of ours; we need to listen to such victims, not sideline them, nor silence them, but give them a voice and really hear them. There is also deserved shame, however. If I do something shameful, I should feel shame—if I were the abuser of that victims we just discussed, for example. Not that anyone should let shame decimate their sense of self or think of themselves as unredeemable, nor should engage in the practice of shaming. That is different, and little compatible with loving our neighbors as ourselves. To get a better understanding of shame, both undeserved and deserved, let’s consider an example of both.

If you have the time, watch the first half of the following clip.

It is a 1981 YouTube clip of Mister Rogers hosting a ten-year-old wheelchair-bound Jeffrey Erlanger. They had originally met five years before, and Rogers remembered him and invited him to his Neighborhood. Fred would later say that these unscripted ten minutes were his most memorable moment on television. The scene is deeply moving, and if there’s any doubt as to why, I might suggest it has to do, at least in part, with this matter of shame. Ours is sadly a society in which certain people—those who have been sexually abused, those with visible disabilities—carry a stigma and are often, for no fault of their own, riddled with a sense of shame—a loss of social standing, and a resultant tendency to shrink and hide. It threatens their sense of humanity. The solution has to be communal—usually involving someone with social capital to spare conferring honor upon them.

And that is exactly what makes those ten minutes of television so undeniably magical. It is a simply profound microcosm of the divine love that deigns and condescends to broken and marginalized people and, in the process, exalts them, replacing shame with honor, beauty for ashes. Mister Rogers gets eye level with Jeff, asks him about his experiences, gives the boy a chance to share about his condition and feelings, and talks to him like a friend. Like Mister Rogers did for Jeffrey—who was on the stage years later to confer on Rogers his Lifetime Achievement Award—this is a means by which to make goodness attractive, which is sort of part of our job description as Christians. It’s an important way to love God and our neighbor.

And now an example of deserved shame. The pages of scripture are replete with narratives of honor and shame, from Adam and Eve to the story of the prodigal son and lots in between. You know the story of the prodigal son. He insists on his inheritance ahead of time and engages in profligate spending and living, bringing shame on himself and an almost complete loss of social standing as a result. Finally, he repents and comes home, and the father, seeing him far off, comes running to him with a kiss and embrace. Here is a young man who did shame-worthy things. He felt shame, and he deserved to, and he couldn’t fix it on his own. He needed someone to confer on him the honor he had lost.

And this gives us as believers a simply wonderful opportunity. As Gregg Ten Elshof puts it in his forthcoming excellent book For Shame, “All of us, whether we have social capital to spare or not, are in a position to remind those around us that each and every person is loved and pursued by the God of the universe. The maker of heaven and earth is in a full sprint—robes and all—to embrace you, kiss you, put a ring on your finger, and throw a feast in your honor. Whatever the opinion of the company you keep, you are of immeasurable value to the One who matters most. You are so valuable that the God of the universe suffered the indignity of limited human form, betrayal, public humiliation, and naked crucifixion to rescue you not just from guilt, but also from the shame of your condition, all to enjoy an eternal life of friendship and communion with you.”

If there is any doubt that this is what the life and work of Jesus was all about, recall the OT passage that inaugurated his public ministry in Luke, from Isaiah 61: “The Spirit of the Lord GOD is on Me, because the LORD has anointed Me to preach good news to the poor. He has sent Me to bind up the brokenhearted, to proclaim liberty to the captives and freedom to the prisoners, to proclaim the year of the LORD’s favor and the day of our God’s vengeance, to comfort all who mourn, to console the mourners in Zion—to give them a crown of beauty for ashes, the oil of joy for mourning, and a garment of praise for a spirit of despair.”

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David Baggett is professor of philosophy and Director of the Center for Moral Apologetics at Houston Baptist University.

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What Makes Something Morally Good or Bad? Natural Law vs. Divine Command Theory (Part 3)

Editor’s note: Adam Johnson has graciously allowed us to republish his video series, “What Makes Something Morally Good or Bad?” Find the original post here.

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The two predominant positions within Christianity that answer the question of “Where does objective morality come from?” are known as Natural Law Theory and Divine Command Theory. Both theories have strengths and weaknesses, which leads to robust debate between proponents of each. Natural Law Theory says that both human moral values (i.e., what things are good and bad) and moral obligations (i.e., what things are right and wrong to do) come from facts about what causes human beings to flourish. In Natural Law Theory, God created the world, including human beings, and thus something is good or right when it causes human beings to flourish. On the other hand, Divine Command Theory says that our moral obligations come from God’s commands. Right and wrong are determined by what God commands us to do, and God commands us according to what is good. In this lecture, Adam explores each of these theories and discusses objections against each offered by proponents of the other.

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Adam Lloyd Johnson serves as a university campus missionary with Ratio Christi. He also teaches classes for Midwestern Baptist Theological Seminary and spends one month each year living and teaching at Rhineland Theological Seminary in Wölmersen, Germany. Adam received his PhD in Theological Studies with an emphasis in Philosophy of Religion from Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary in 2020.

Lord's Supper Meditation: Death and Renewal

A Twilight Musing 

           The Catholic doctrine of the Lord's Supper holds that it re-enacts the sacrifice of Christ on the cross each time it is observed, even to the point of the substance of the bread and wine being turned into the actual body and blood of Christ.  Protestants have correctly rejected that doctrine in its most literal form, but the idea has relevance to what we ought to experience in the observance of this symbolic feast.  If we give ourselves over to the action of God's presence in our lives as we partake of the Lord's Supper, He will enable us repeatedly to sacrifice our bodies so that they are put to death and renewed in service to Him.  Paul admonishes Christians to “present your bodies as a living sacrifice, holy and acceptable to God, which is your spiritual worship” (Rom. 12:1).

           The Lord’s Supper, then, serves to focus our thoughts more effectively on what it means to die with Christ and to be raised to "newness of life."  I think the most memorable scripture to encapsulate this concept is Gal. 2:20: "I have been crucified with Christ and I no longer live, but Christ lives in me."  When we take the bread, we embrace the sacrifice of our sinful desires by applying to ourselves what Jesus did on the cross.  Though we continue to exist in these fleshly shells in order to serve Him on this earth as long as He chooses, they are not the real "us."  Paul goes on to say, "The life I live in the body, I live by faith in the Son of God."  Imprisoned as we are by "this body of death" (Rom. 7:24), the only way that we can describe our existence on this earth as life is by faith that God has instilled His life in us through what Christ did on the cross.  Thus, as we partake of the wine, we affirm anew that though we are dead, yet we live through the life-giving blood of Christ.

           The transformation that occurs in our partaking of the Lord’s Supper is not in the elements of bread and wine, but in ourselves.  Through the Holy Spirit within us, God empowers us to transcend these sinful and frail bodies and to complete joyfully and purposefully whatever He has set for us to do while we are yet in this world.

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Dr. Elton Higgs was a faculty member in the English department of the University of Michigan-Dearborn from 1965-2001. Having retired from UM-D as Prof. of English in 2001, he now lives with his wife in Jackson, MI. He has published scholarly articles on Chaucer, Langland, the Pearl Poet, Shakespeare, and Milton. Recently, Dr. Higgs has self-published a collection of his poetry called Probing Eyes: Poems of a Lifetime, 1959-2019, as well as a book inspired by The Screwtape Letters, called The Ichabod Letters, available as an e-book from Moral Apologetics. (Ed.: Dr. Higgs was the most important mentor during undergrad for the creator of this website, and his influence was inestimable.

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Living HOPE: Pastoral Counseling and the Resurrection of Jesus

Introduction: Hurt and Hope

When reflecting upon nearly forty years of a pastoral ministry carried out in numerous forms and contexts, two recurring realities emerge as most prominent in my experience. First, people are often profoundly troubled and deeply hurting amid the moral chaos and cultural decay of a sin-stricken world, resulting in a brokenness that reaches to the deepest recesses of the human mind and heart. Second, the gospel—the hopeful proclamation of the now-and-not-yet kingdom of God as manifested in the deity, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ—is the greatest source of healing for individuals, families, churches, and cultures.[1] In a word, the world is profoundly out of sorts and only Jesus can set it to rights. It is the concomitance of these two concerns which provide much of the context and content of what has become something of a specialized focus in my ministry, namely the ongoing need (even demand) for competent, biblically based, gospel centric pastoral counseling. Bearing this in mind, the following reflection is offered as a brief introduction to a model of pastoral counseling utilizing the acrostic HOPE (Hear the Pain; Optimize Passional Reason: Proclaim the Gospel; Emphasize the Resurrection). Of particular significance for this model is that it gives principal place to the implications of the resurrection and moral transformation in the caregiving process. The intention is to demonstrate vis-à-vis a notional scenario derived from real counseling experiences how the resurrection provides a key component in helping broken people experience moral transformation and lasting wholeness.

H: Hear the Pain

Scenario: Randy walked into the pastor’s office with a look of consternation on his face and a certain slowness in his step. The appointment was scheduled the prior Sunday after Randy asked for prayer at the conclusion of the service. The pastor had heard a certain familiar pain in Randy’s voice, so he offered to not only pray that day, but to meet in person for a follow-up counseling discussion. Randy was happy to accept the offer, and now he stood in the office. “Sit down, Randy,” said the pastor, “and tell me what’s on your mind.” Randy sat opposite the pastor’s desk and, after an opening prayer by the pastor, began to share his story. Moment by moment, hurt by hurt, Randy recounted his experience with Post Traumatic Stress precipitated by several tours of combat in Iraq. The pastor listened intently, careful not to interrupt and trying to avoid anything like a leading question; his concern was to give Randy ample space and time to tell his story, and it was quite a story. At one point the emotion in Randy’s voice became heightened and he burst into tears as he recounted the loss of several dear friends during a combat operation gone awry. It was clear that Randy was hurting, and the pastor was glad Randy was able to get the hurt out into the open in the safety of a counseling session.

Discussion: All counseling begins with listening, or at least it should.[2] It is when the pastor listens without leading or stifling responses, that the counselee can paint the picture of the problem that brought them to seek help. As the counselor listens, there are two goals: 1) establish with the counselee that the pastor wants to hear before responding, to listen before counseling; and 2) to give the pastor a sense of the depth of the pain involved in the situation and what related matters may need to be addressed later and/or may justify a referral to caregivers with relevant expertise. Further, hearing the person’s pain may involve more than one session where the counselor offers little by way of input, opting to show support by listening intently and for as long as it takes to get the counselee to the place where their burden is sufficiently expressed and understood.[3] Again, counseling begins with listening, with hearing the pain.

O: Optimize Passional Reason

Scenario: After talking for nearly an hour without interruption, Randy began to quiet himself, finally coming to a point of asking, “Pastor, what can I do to get through this pain?” After a thoughtful pause before answering, the pastor replied with a question of his own. “Randy, what do you think would help you?” Seeming a bit frustrated, Randy responded, “I’m not sure. That’s why I’m talking to you, pastor. I need your help.” After another pause, the pastor stated, “Randy, thank you for trusting me with your pain. What I heard as you recounted losing your friends was two things. First, your emotions are up and down, high and low, and I suspect you are unable to find a balance most of the time. Second, there are a few areas in your explanation and evaluation of what you are going through that are a bit out of sorts with what is true.” Randy looked intently at the pastor, nodding slightly. The pastor continued, “Randy, getting to the place of wholeness involves both how you think and how you feel—not one or the other, but both. My goal is to help you think and feel your way through this issue. I want you to learn to check your feelings with your reason, and to allow your reason to be properly informed by your feelings.”

Discussion: Much of what constitutes a counselee’s burden is a mismatch between facts and feelings, between reason and emotions. However, the counselor must not assume that feelings are always wrong, or that the answer to the counselee’s problem is simply a matter of clearer thinking. It is imperative to recall that humans form beliefs based on a combination of reason and emotion, with both coming together and each informing the other so that the whole person comes to a particular conviction or position with their head and their heart. This confluence of reason and emotions in relation to forming beliefs is called passional reason,[4] and counselors who learn to optimize it in the counseling process are more likely to see holistic transformation encompassing noetic and affective capacities in the counselee. Thus, when a counselor begins to engage the counselee’s story, he should look for instances of misshapen thoughts and feelings and explain to the counselee that both areas will be addressed during the counseling process. Lest this point seem to call for some type of specialized knowledge on the part of the pastor, consider that with or without the nomenclature of passional reason there is an intuitive sense that thinking and feeling are fundamental aspects of being human. Thus, optimizing passional reason is simply another way of inviting the counselee to experience wholeness as a “whole” person, beginning with their thoughts and feelings.

P: Proclaim the Gospel

Scenario: Randy sat for a moment, then asked, “So what you’re saying, pastor, is that my head and my heart need healing?” “Correct,” replied the pastor, “and that healing begins with hearing one more time something I know you already believe with all your mind and heart.” After sitting quietly for another moment, Randy replied, “What do I need to hear, pastor?” Looking intently at Randy, the pastor spoke with passion and clarity, “Randy, Jesus is Lord. He died and rose again. He loves you, and because he rose again and overcame death, he can and will help you overcome your pain and grief.” After letting those words of the gospel settle onto Randy for a moment, the pastor continued, “Randy, am I right? Do you believe the gospel with all your heart and mind? Do you believe that Jesus is Lord, and that he died for you, rose again for you, and is right now at his Father’s right hand, praying for you?” With tears in his eyes, his voice breaking, Randy replied, “Yes, pastor, I do believe those things.” “Good, Randy,” replied the pastor, “because the Jesus’ resurrection is essential to your wholeness and healing.”

Discussion: What makes Christian counseling unique is not method but focus. The Christian counselor’s ultimate point of reference from beginning to end of the caregiving process is the message of the gospel.[5] While the pastor’s counsel may include more than the gospel, it certainly should never leave out the gospel. In this sense, pastoral counseling is evangelical counseling, which is to say that it is counseling through the lens of the evangel, the good news, the gospel. Thus, in the notional scenario the pastor has laid the groundwork by hearing the pain of the counselee and optimizing passional reason as the epistemic pathway to wholeness. Now enters the gospel, which encapsulates all the hope the counselee seeks. While there may be varied approaches to proclaiming the gospel and different points of emphasis by its proclaimers, what is fundamental to the Christian path to remedy is the declaration of the deity, death, and resurrection of King Jesus. It is not enough to assume that because counseling is Christian that the gospel is clear. Rather, the pastor has the privilege and necessity to proclaim the gospel to his counselee, thereby given center place to the lordship of Jesus over death and the grave as his resurrection is highlighted as the ultimate demonstration of victory in place of defeat.

E: Emphasize the Resurrection

Scenario: Randy continued to listen as he leaned forward in his chair and drew a bead on the pastor with his eyes. The pastor continued, “Randy, the healing you seek in your mind and heart will take time, but it is possible because of Jesus’ victory over the grave. What we will do going forward is sort of like taking a tube of antibiotic cream and applying and reapplying it to an open wound, except in this instance the wound is your Post Traumatic Stress, and the antibiotic cream is the resurrection.” Randy thought for a moment, then asked, “Pastor, exactly how does that work? I mean, how do I apply the resurrection to my situation?” After a pause, the pastor replied, “Think of it like this. You told me that lately you struggle most with a feeling of hopelessness when you think of how your heart seems to know only an aching sense of despair. You wonder if it is possible to ever get past the hurt and loss.” Randy nodded in agreement. “Your homework is to write down on a card that you will carry with you at all times the following: ‘But if the Spirit of Him who raised Jesus from the dead dwells in you, He who raised Christ from the dead will also give life to your mortal bodies through His Spirit who dwells in you.’ That is Romans 8:11, and it is a powerful reminder that the Spirit is at work in you giving you the life—the same life—that brought Jesus from the dead. His resurrection is your victory, and as often as you find yourself struggling with the thoughts of despair you must apply the hope of the gospel to your situation. Over time you will come to experience a change in your outlook as your mind learns that the hopeless thought is a trigger to the hope of the resurrection. This is how you can do what Paul said later in Romans 12:2, ‘be transformed by the renewing of your mind.’” A smile came to Randy’s face, the first one the pastor had seen since the session began. “Pastor,” Randy said with confidence, “I know I have a long way to go, but I’m starting to think and feel like I can get there with your help…with Jesus’ help. His resurrection is my hope.” “You are right, Randy, there is hope because of Jesus’ resurrection.”

Discussion: As an example of the blending of methods from cognitive behavior therapy and the hope of the Christian gospel that flows from the resurrection, what the pastor offers is an approach to healing the mind and emotions with the truth of Scripture that capitalizes on neuroplasticity and trigger thoughts/words.[6] Again, just as with passional reason, so with this aspect of pastoral counseling there is no need for the pastor to be an expert in various counseling modalities. Rather, through a simple and consistent process of learning to correct thoughts and feelings with the hope of the resurrection, the pastor can lead the counselee along the path of a renewed mind and heart. In the notional scenario discussed here, the pastor would continue to help Randy apply the truths of God’s Word, and especially the message of Jesus’ resurrection to the thoughts and feelings that are out of sync with the Spirit’s work in sanctification. This would happen over numerous counseling sessions and periodic check ups thereafter.

Conclusion: Hope Lives Because Jesus Arose

Although only briefly, this discussion has considered how the resurrection can play a significant role in pastoral counseling. While a more complete exploration of the topic merits far more space, this is offered as a start to an important topic for Christian counseling. By utilizing the HOPE acrostic, the notional scenario illustrates how a pastor may combine elements of cognitive behavior therapy with the gospel message of the deity, death, and resurrection of Jesus. The counselor hears the counselee’s pain, optimizes passional reason, proclaims the gospel, and emphasizes the resurrection in ways that help the counselee apply the truth of Jesus’ victory over death to their struggles and shortcomings. Indeed, because of the resurrection, hope lives in a tangible and powerful way through the work of pastoral counseling.

Bibliography

Collins, Gary R. The Biblical Basis of Christian Counseling for People Helpers: Relating the Basic Teachings of Scripture to People’s Problems. Colorado Springs: NavPress, 2001.

Kollar, Charles Allen. Solution-Focused Pastoral Counseling: An Effective Short-Term Approach for Getting People Back on Track. 2nd ed. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2011.

Shields, Harry, and Gary Bredfeldt. Caring for Souls: Counseling Under the Authority of Scripture. Chicago: Moody, 2001.

Wainwright, William J. Reason and the Heart: A Prolegomenon to a Critique of Passional Reason. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995.

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[1] Cf. 1 Cor. 15:3-4. Unless otherwise noted, all Scripture quotes are from The Holy Bible: New King James Version (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 1982).

[2] For a discussion of the importance of listening to the counselee, see Harry Shields and Gary Bredfeldt, Caring for Souls: Counseling Under the Authority of Scripture (Chicago: Moody, 2001), 179-180.

[3] Charles Allen Kollar, Solution-Focused Pastoral Counseling: An Effective Short-Term Approach for Getting People Back on Track, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2011), 79-88.

[4] William J. Wainwright, Reason and the Heart: A Prolegomenon to a Critique of Passional Reason (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995), 1-6.

[5] Gary R. Collins, The Biblical Basis of Christian Counseling for People Helpers: Relating the Basic Teachings of Scripture to People’s Problems (Colorado Springs: NavPress, 2001), 3-11.

[6] Shields and Bredfeldt, Caring for Souls, 193-223.

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T. J. Gentry is the Executive Editor of MoralApologetics.com, the Senior Minister at First Christian Church of West Frankfort, IL, and the Co-founder of Good Reasons Apologetics. T. J. has been in Christian ministry since 1984, having served as an itinerant evangelist, youth minister, church planter, pastoral counselor, and Army chaplain. He is the author of numerous books and peer-reviewed articles, including Pulpit Apologist: The Vital Link between Preaching and Apologetics (Wipf and Stock, 2020), You Shall Be My Witnesses: Reflections on Sharing the Gospel (Illative House, 2018), and two forthcoming works published by Moral Apologetics Press: Leaving Calvinism, Finding Grace, and A Moral Way: Aquinas and the Good God. T. J. is a Clinical Pastoral Education Supervisor, holding board-certification as a Pastoral Counselor and a Chaplain. He is a graduate of Southern Illinois University (BA in Political Science), Luther Rice College and Seminary (MA in Apologetics), Holy Apostles College and Seminary (MA in Philosophy), Liberty University (MAR in Church Ministries, MDiv in Chaplaincy, ThM in Theology), Carolina University (DMin in Pastoral Counseling, PhD in Leadership, PhD in Biblical Studies), and the United States Army Chaplain School (Basic and Advanced Courses). He is currently completing his PhD in Theology at North-West University, Potchefstroom, South Africa (2021), his PhD in Theology and Apologetics at Liberty University (2022), and his PhD in Philosophy of Religion at Southern Evangelical Seminary (2024). T. J. married Amy in 1995, and they are blessed with three daughters and two sons. T. J.’s writing and other projects may be viewed at TJGentry.com.

Loki and the Locus of Identity

Warning: This article contains spoilers of the Disney+ series “Loki.”

 Loki is a television series found on Disney’s streaming service called Disney+. It follows the life of Loki after he swiped the tesseract and was swept into another dimension. He is captured for crimes against time by the TVA (Time Variance Authority). As the series progresses, Loki introspectively reviews his life, his multiple failures, and what makes a Loki a Loki. He encounters other variations of himself by the integration of beings across multiple dimensional timelines. He comes to meet a female version of himself who calls herself Sylvie. Oddly, he finds that he finds the love of his life in a deviation of himself. That is to say, the only love of his life is himself.

            Loki’s quest to find his identity reminds me of an episode of the television series The Big Bang Theory. In one episode, the gregariously free-spirited Penny meets the hyper-analytical Dr. Beverly Hofstader who is mother to Dr. Leonard Hofstader, Penny’s next-door neighbor and future husband. Beverly uses her psychoanalytical skills to inquire into the life of the vivacious young Penny. At one point, Penny notes that she is an aspiring actress. Beverly coldly retorts, “Why?” She goes on to pinpoint that Penny suffers from an external locus of identity. That is, Penny finds her sense of identity in what others think of her. Likewise, it may be said of Loki that he found his value of identity by what others thought of him. Perhaps Loki desired to rule the world because of his deep insecurities about what others thought of him. If he ruled the world, then everyone must appreciate him. Yet as one evaluates three loci of identity, one begins to find one option is much better than the other two.

The External Locus of Identity: To Find One’s Value in What Others Think

            Every person likes to be liked. As the saying goes, people will buy things they don’t need, with money they don’t have, to impress people they don’t even like. For this reason, individuals will spend exorbitant amounts of money for the latest and hippest clothing, the fanciest cars, and the most luxurious homes to stand out as an impressive person. Others will spend countless hours in the gym to chisel themselves into the image of a Grecian god or goddess so as to receive the approval of individuals in their community. An invisible form of competition emanates in the mental state of a person to see if they can outdo everyone else around them. The problem with the external locus of identity is twofold. First, the internal competition against all others is doomed for failure because somewhere and somehow, someone is always better than you in some capacity. The Westernized conception of competitiveness has its setbacks particularly when a person sets oneself against all others. Additionally, the person will never rest and appreciate what one possesses because he or she is always seeing to best their adversaries. In contrast, the apostle Paul noted that he had “learned to be content in whatever circumstances I find myself” (Phil. 4:11, CSB). Second, the internal competition is impossible to win because not even Jesus himself could please everyone. The early church taught that Jesus was sinless (2 Cor. 5:21; Rom. 3:25-26; Gal. 3:13). As such, Jesus always said the right things, always thought the right things, and always behaved appropriately. Yet he still managed to find himself on a Roman cross condemned with criminals, betrayed by a close compatriot, and buried in a borrowed tomb. If Jesus, the exemplification of perfection, could not please everyone, what makes us think that we can?

The Internal Locus of Identity: To Find One’s Value by How One Sees Oneself

            Some might say that the better option of identity is found by looking within oneself to find one’s identity. While a better alternative than the former, it still elicits problems. John Hare wrote a book entitled The Moral Gap where he identifies a gap between the moral demands placed upon us, both internally and externally, and our ability to meet them. Sagely, Hare denotes that “we see people constantly failing by the moral standards they and we uphold at least verbally, and we want to hold them accountable for each failure.”[1] In response, the church has taken two attitudes to the problem: 1) moral idealism, which holds that people are capable of living good lives and holds them accountable for such, 2) cynical realism, holding that no one can live a virtuous life, thereby removing all blame upon a person for an indiscretion committed.[2] The apostle Paul lamented, “For I do not understand what I am doing, because I do not practice what I want to do, but I do what I hate” (Rom. 7:15, CSB). If a person finds one’s sense of identity only within oneself, the person’s inability to live perfectly could cause great stress and strain on one’s mental and emotional faculties. Not to mention, the mind plays horrid tricks on a person much like a funhouse mirror, leading to false notions of oneself (i.e., he/she is not worthy of love, he/she will never do better in life, and so on). Is there not a better way?

The Upward Locus of Identity: Seeing Oneself through the Lens of God

            Thankfully, a better choice is found in possessing an upward locus of identity. By this, it is meant that a person finds one’s worth and value in God’s love and value for the person. This perspective is not unique in Christian thinking. In his eighth book on The Trinity, Augustine argued that God is the good and that human beings find ultimate happiness and value when they enter into a loving relationship with a good God.[3] By this union, God’s righteousness unites with the receptive person and guides the person to live ethically and morally. Hare states, “The emphasis is not on Christ’s righteousness being external to us, but on the unity he establishes between himself and us.”[4] Granted, professing Christians do not always act ethically. However, it can be said that moral transformation can only come about by the unity with the good God and continued dependence on his moral empowerment. Ultimately, a person’s sense of worth, value, and ethics is vastly intensified and expanded when a person sees oneself through the lens of God. Romans 8:31-39 becomes an integral aspect of one’s sense of worth as it is realized that nothing can separate him or her from the awe-inspiring love of God.

Conclusion

            Much, much more could be said about this topic. But to conclude, think of the following scenario. How would the fictional Loki’s character have changed had he been able to view himself through the Creator’s lens? Would he have sought a better relationship with his brother Thor? Would he have resolved the conflicts he had with his father Odin? What about Penny of the Big Bang Theory? Would she still have desired to be an actress if she was not as concerned with how other people viewed her? While Loki and Penny are fictional characters, their internal conflicts and sense of self-worth are far from make-believe. Real-life people deal with these issues every day. Loki and Penny can serve as parables for us to exemplify the need to view ourselves not as others see us or even how we see ourselves, but rather to see ourselves by the divine viewpoint of God. Experiencing the love and moral transformation that comes from a real-life omnibenevolent God is much better than what any writer of fiction could ever muster.

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About the Author

Brian G. Chilton is the founder of BellatorChristi.com, the host of The Bellator Christi Podcast, the author of the Layman’s Manual on Christian Apologetics, and a Ph.D. Candidate of the Theology and Apologetics program at Liberty University. He received his Master of Divinity in Theology from Liberty University (with high distinction); his Bachelor of Science in Religious Studies and Philosophy from Gardner-Webb University (with honors); and received certification in Christian Apologetics from Biola University. Brian is a member of the Evangelical Theological Society and the Evangelical Philosophical Society. Brian has served in pastoral ministry for nearly 20 years and currently serves as a clinical chaplain, an editor for the Eleutheria Journal, and an Associate Editor for MoralApologetics.com.

https://www.amazon.com/Laymans-Manual-Christian-Apologetics-Essentials/dp/1532697104

© 2021. BellatorChristi.com.

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[1] John E. Hare, The Moral Gap: Kantian Ethics, Human Limits, and God’s Assistance, Oliver O’Donovan, ed (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1996), 140.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Augustine of Hippo, On the Trinity, in St. Augustine: On the Holy Trinity, Doctrinal Treatises, Moral Treatises, Philip Schaff, ed, Arthur West Haddan, trans, vol. 3 of A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church, first series (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Company, 1887), 244; David Baggett and Marybeth Baggett, The Morals of the Story: Good News about a Good God (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2018), 66.

[4] Hare, The Moral Gap, 263.

Making Sense of Morality: Objections from Euthyphro and Evil

Editor’s note: R. Scott Smith has graciously allowed us to republish his series, “Making Sense of Morality.” You can find the original post here.

Introduction

In the previous post, I argued that there is another explanation for the ground of core morals, such as justice and love are good, and murder and rape are wrong: they are grounded in God. However, there are a couple serious objections that I will address here, and then I will summarize several of my findings.

Euthyphro Dilemma

“Euthyphro” poses a dilemma: are morals good because God commands them, or does God command them because they are good? If the former, it seems God’s will alone is the ground of morals. But, it seems God could will whatever God wanted, and it would be moral. If so, God could will things we clearly know are wrong, even evil, such as justice being bad, and rape being permissible. Earlier, I suggested this issue seems to face Allah, due to the supremacy of Allah’s sovereignty.

If the latter, it seems God’s commands are redundant, for we already should know morals are valid. Also, they seem to be valid independently of God; if so, God is not needed to ground morals. Moreover, God must consult these morals before commanding them.

 Regarding the former, the Scriptures of Judaism and Christianity portray God as being morally perfect and good. That is, God is bound by God’s character, so God would not will something that is contrary to that character. Moreover, that God is good fits with what we may know by reason and reflection (i.e., what many have called natural law), including our core morals and others too (e.g., we should not torture babies for fun).

On the latter, we may need to have some understanding of goodness before we can know God is good. But, it does not follow from that that morals are independent of God. Further, just because we can know some moral truths without God’s commands (e.g., by reason), still we possess a remarkable ability to suppress or rationalize away what we know morally. In that case, God’s commanding something we can know via reason would not be redundant, but a reinforcement and clarification of that knowledge. 

Back to Evil

So far, I’ve suggested that the best explanation of our core morals is that they are grounded in God’s moral character. But, is there more we can infer by reason?

Suppose we consider evil. Many think evil provides one of the strongest arguments against God’s existence. Yet, what kind of thing is evil? Earlier, I suggested that evil is a privation (or perversion) of goodness. Indeed, it seems hard to define evil is some way other than the way things should not be.

If that is the case, evil presupposes goodness, like Augustine suggested. What then is the best explanation for this standard of goodness? Above, I suggested it is God’s own character. Yet, we can infer more, I think. To be truly good, God must be love. This suggests God is personal. Furthermore, to be truly good, God must be truly just.

Together, these two findings suggest that God would deal with evil, yet in love and care for humans. This in turn raises questions for consideration that are beyond the scope of this book: which God is this? And, has God done this? If so, how? What are implications for us?

Final Thoughts

We have completed our survey of the major moral views in the west. I’ve argued that the best explanation for our core morals is that they are universals that are grounded in God’s morally good character. I’ve argued for this while also arguing for several more key points; e.g.:

• Nominalism is false, and Platonic-like universals exist;

• There are essences, including of core morals, human beings, and mental states (they have intentionality); and

• We can know reality directly, even though our situatedness does affect us in significant ways. So, historicism is mistaken.

Notice too that from our findings, the fact-value split, the deeply held belief that science uniquely gives us knowledge of the facts, whereas ethics and religion give us just opinions and preferences, is false. Science, if grounded in naturalism and nominalism, cannot give us knowledge at all. On the other hand, we do have ethical knowledge of at least our four core morals. Maybe there are more we can know. We also have justified reasons to believe it is true that God is ground of morals – another item of knowledge.

For Further Reading

William Alston, “What Euthyphro Should Have Said,” in Philosophy of Religion: A Reader and Guide, gen. ed. William Lane Craig

R. Scott Smith, In Search of Moral Knowledge, chs. 12-13

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R. Scott Smith is a Christian philosopher and apologist, with special interests in ethics, knowledge, and seeing the body of Christ live in the fullness of the Spirit and truth.

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Lord’s Supper Meditation: God’s Eternal “Now”

A Twilight Musing

          As we gather around Christ’s table, we begin with the purpose the Lord established, that is, remembering Him.  But paradoxically, we are also invited by God to suspend time by uniting past and future into God’s divine “Now.”  For in our own mortal past lies sin, and in our natural future as human beings lies damnation.   But as we symbolically drink the blood of Christ, we tap into the artery of Divine Life, which has no beginning and no end; and in eating the bread we reaffirm our participation in the immortal risen Body of Christ.  In both, we celebrate our liberation from the tyranny of time; having sacrificed to Him our past and our future, we experience His reaffirmation that within us we have, through the Holy Spirit, a portion of the timeless Life that is, and was, and ever shall be.   

          What are the implications of this epiphany of suspended time in the Lord’s Supper?  For one thing, it means that we are not doomed to carrying the baggage of the past, nor to fearing the pitfalls and uncertainties of the future.  Both are subsumed by the absolute safety of God’s time-redeeming “Now.” 

          There is also a message of divine fellowship in God’s perfect “Now.”  Just as in Christ we are freed from our own sinful actions of past and future, so we are also freed from the bondage of bitterness, whether in a long-held response to past actions of others or in a readiness to take offense in the future.  If we are truly in God’s “Now,” there is no longer any need to maintain our pride or our imagined welfare by holding grudges or harboring suspicions against one another.  The refreshing dew of God’s power of forgiveness is always available to us.

          So beginning with a humble remembrance of what God has done for us in the sacrifice of Christ, we can reaffirm that the efficacy of that sacrifice is eternally new, and that it enables us to transcend our captivity to time and all that is mortal.

               REGRETS

It's part of Adam's curse

That here the past is never quite forgot;

Though God can blot it out,

We humans find the bitter-sweet of past events

To be the ever-present evidence

Of our mortality.

The Lethe of God's forgiveness

Is imperfectly imbibed

In this domain of time;

But even diluted doses

Bespeak an unstained "now"

In another clime.

                                                --Elton D. Higgs

                                                    Dec. 29, 1976

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Dr. Elton Higgs was a faculty member in the English department of the University of Michigan-Dearborn from 1965-2001. Having retired from UM-D as Prof. of English in 2001, he now lives with his wife in Jackson, MI. He has published scholarly articles on Chaucer, Langland, the Pearl Poet, Shakespeare, and Milton. Recently, Dr. Higgs has self-published a collection of his poetry called Probing Eyes: Poems of a Lifetime, 1959-2019, as well as a book inspired by The Screwtape Letters, called The Ichabod Letters, available as an e-book from Moral Apologetics. (Ed.: Dr. Higgs was the most important mentor during undergrad for the creator of this website, and his influence was inestimable.

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My Dear Apologist, Please Be Holy.

Apologist, I have a question for you. If forced to choose, which would you rather have, holiness or a good answer? Should be obvious which one to choose, right? Of course, we should want to be holy more than we want good answers. Further, it’s not as though holiness and good answers are opposed to one another, are they? But I have noticed a disturbing tendency in apologists over the years, a tendency toward separating the work of the craft of apologetics and the work of moral transformation. Apologists sometimes abound in facts, arguments, and answers, all the while lacking in any deliberate expression of personal holiness. So, I say to you: my dear apologist, please be holy.

Here are two instances where I think we have room to grow in our holiness as apologists. These are what I would call examples of “practical apologetic holiness.” First, there is a holy and unholy way to present an opponent’s position on a given topic of debate. It is unholy to replace what an unbeliever said with a strawman. When we do this, we are bearing false witness; we are lying. Nothing holy about that, is there? Rather than giving in to this foolish and sinful temptation, why not take the honorable and holy route of always…and I mean always…presenting the best argument an opponent has to offer. Jesus did not die to save strawmen, but He did die to save that person whose argument we should learn and carefully present. So, learn what the atheist is saying, and then, with a commitment to bearing true witness and honoring the One who is truth Himself, show practical apologetic holiness by giving your opponent an honest and faithful representation.

Second, there is a holy and unholy way to present an argument. For example, anytime I stoop to make an ad hominem argument I am not arguing in a holy way. Even if my opponent is a truly unsavory character whose moral compass is clearly broken, it is not honoring to God, or my opponent, or myself to make a personal attack rather than a careful and charitable argument based on the substance of their ideas. When someone resorts to ad hominem attacks it reveals a lack of appreciation for the very sacredness of the moment when one person’s ideas are considered against another’s. Every encounter in apologetics is with an image bearer of God, one whose existence is precious and of infinite worth, such that to encounter an opponent of the Gospel is to encounter the reason there is a Gospel. We all need the grace of God, and when I don’t take seriously the argument of a person and choose, instead, to attack them for some real or perceived personal shortcoming I sully the moment and demean the holy work of apologetics. We are seeking to build relationships and see lives transformed, not win arguments at any cost; and only when we make arguments and refuse to ever attack people can we show practical apologetic holiness.

I’m sure you can think of other instances of practical apologetic holiness, and I hope you will. Let us never forget along the way to learning and doing apologetics that holiness is required of us. So, I say to you again: my dear apologist, please be holy.

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More from this series

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T. J. Gentry is the Executive Editor of MoralApologetics.com, the Senior Minister at First Christian Church of West Frankfort, IL, and the Co-founder of Good Reasons Apologetics. T. J. has been in Christian ministry since 1984, having served as an itinerant evangelist, youth minister, church planter, pastoral counselor, and Army chaplain. He is the author of numerous books and peer-reviewed articles, including Pulpit Apologist: The Vital Link between Preaching and Apologetics (Wipf and Stock, 2020), You Shall Be My Witnesses: Reflections on Sharing the Gospel (Illative House, 2018), and two forthcoming works published by Moral Apologetics Press: Leaving Calvinism, Finding Grace, and A Moral Way: Aquinas and the Good God. T. J. is a Clinical Pastoral Education Supervisor, holding board-certification as a Pastoral Counselor and a Chaplain. He is a graduate of Southern Illinois University (BA in Political Science), Luther Rice College and Seminary (MA in Apologetics), Holy Apostles College and Seminary (MA in Philosophy), Liberty University (MAR in Church Ministries, MDiv in Chaplaincy, ThM in Theology), Carolina University (DMin in Pastoral Counseling, PhD in Leadership, PhD in Biblical Studies), and the United States Army Chaplain School (Basic and Advanced Courses). He is currently completing his PhD in Theology at North-West University, Potchefstroom, South Africa (2021), his PhD in Theology and Apologetics at Liberty University (2022), and his PhD in Philosophy of Religion at Southern Evangelical Seminary (2024). T. J. married Amy in 1995, and they are blessed with three daughters and two sons. T. J.’s writing and other projects may be viewed at TJGentry.com.

Loki and the Problem of Determinism

Warning: This article contains spoilers of the Disney Plus Series “Loki.”

Recently, my family and I binged the series Loki which is the latest of the burgeoning MCU[1] programs on Disney Plus. While all MCU programs thus far have been very well done—and mind you, I am a huge MCU fan—the Loki series proved to engage deep philosophical and theological questions which should be considered and pondered.

The series begins with a scene from the movie Avengers: Endgame where Loki steals the tesseract and warps himself into another dimension of time. Having thought that he outsmarted his foes once again, the God of Mischief discovered that he would soon be captive to an organization that protected time itself. Since he had disrupted the timeline, he had become dangerous to the TVA (Time Variance Authority) and thus labeled a “variant.” Eventually, Loki meets numerous iterations of himself including a female version known as Lady Loki. Lady Loki abhors the name and decides to call herself “Sylvie.” Loki finds himself in love with Sylvie, the only true love of his life. Technically, he falls in love with himself which creates a whole other set of problems for another time and another article.

The first season of the Loki series ends with Loki and Sylvie standing before a scientist who found a way to stabilize time. Known only as “He Who Remains” (most likely, he either is or will become the fierce villain Kang the Conqueror), the mystery man reveals that he has plotted the lives of every single person in every dimension to stabilize the flow of time. Free will is a farce according to this mystery man as each event was scripted which led Loki and Sylvie to the point that they would meet him. This led to a threshold event in which the One Who Remains found himself at a point that he did not know what would occur.

Sylvie and Loki found themselves at a crossroads trying to decide what to do with the timekeeper. Sylvie desired to kill the keeper of time because she deemed him responsible for what she considered a meaningless life, whereas Loki viewed the timekeeper as a necessary evil. After an epic combat scene, Sylvie warped Loki back to the momentarily defunct TVA before killing the timekeeper. This leads us to our current question: Is God like the One Who Remains? This question kept plaguing my mind as the series unfolded. For three reasons, God’s involvement with the arrow of time is unlike the timekeeper of the Loki series.

1.     God grants moral freedom to creatures, unlike the MCU timekeeper.

While various sects of Christianity may differ in this concept, the cumulative biblical and philosophical data suggests that people are free. As Thomas Aquinas masterfully contended, “I answer that, Man has free-will: otherwise counsels, exhortations, commands, prohibitions, rewards and punishments would be in vain.”[2] Morally speaking, a strict determinist God may be likened to the MCU timekeeper. In such a universe, one discovers oneself in a situation not that dissimilar to the Hindu caste system, whereby a person cannot free oneself from the caste in which one is born. In contrast, as Baggett and Wells denote, “freedom is altogether at home in a universe that is the creation of a perfectly good God who freely created this universe and made us in his image.”[3]

2.     God’s foreknowledge does not necessitate determinism unlike the MCU timekeeper.

Unlike the MCU timekeeper, Scripture defines God as a necessarily omniscient Being. The psalmist praises God as being “great, vast in power; his understanding is infinite” (Psa. 147:5, CSB). It is also noted that God knows a word that comes to a person’s mouth before it is even uttered (Psa. 139:4). The late Thomas Oden defined omniscience as “the infinite consciousness of God in relation to all possible objects of knowledge.”[4] As such, God is intricately involved in all aspects of life. However, God’s knowledge does not necessitate God’s dictation of all events. As Tim Stratton has argued, God’s knowledge includes free choices, but “God does not cause a person’s choices.”[5] Oden further states, “God not only grasps and understands what actually will happen, but also what could happen under varied possible contingencies.”[6] Thus, an Anselmian God—the maximally great Being—is one who knows all choices without forcing choices on a creature.

3.     God’s moral code means that he desires the best for all people, unlike the MCU timekeeper.

The MCU timekeeper was not concerned about the wellbeing of those under his watch care. Rather, he was merely interested in keeping the timeline together. While the timekeeper claimed to loath the position he held, his last words before dying seemed to suggest otherwise. The suspense builds! Enter the ominous music. In contrast, God is an omnibenevolent Being who desires the best for all people. One could not argue the same in deterministic models. The best data suggests that God loves us and has given all of us inherent dignity and worth.[7] Rather than bargaining with Loki and Sylvie to provide them their best life, God desires the best for all creatures. It is because of human rebellion and the impact of sin that people are unable to live to their maximal potential, something which in my opinion will be corrected in heaven.

Conclusion

The Loki series on Disney Plus is a philosophically rich program. In my honest opinion, I believe it is one of the best television programs of the MCU currently available on the streaming app. With that said, some may be tempted to compare He Who Remains (potentially an iteration of Kang the Conqueror) with the Anselmian God of Scripture. However, as has been shown, the two are worlds, if not dimensions, apart. Unlike the MCU timekeeper, God has given his creation moral freedom, purpose, and meaning. We truly serve a good God who desires the very best for us all.

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Brian G. Chilton is the founder of BellatorChristi.com, the host of The Bellator Christi Podcast, the author of the Layman’s Manual on Christian Apologetics, and a Ph.D. Candidate of the Theology and Apologetics program at Liberty University. He received his Master of Divinity in Theology from Liberty University (with high distinction); his Bachelor of Science in Religious Studies and Philosophy from Gardner-Webb University (with honors); and received certification in Christian Apologetics from Biola University. Brian is a member of the Evangelical Theological Society and the Evangelical Philosophical Society. Brian has served in pastoral ministry for nearly 20 years and currently serves as a clinical chaplain, an editor for the Eleutheria Journal, and an Associate Editor for MoralApologetics.com.

https://www.amazon.com/Laymans-Manual-Christian-Apologetics-Essentials/dp/1532697104

© 2021. BellatorChristi.com.

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[1] Short for Marvel Comics Universe.

[2] Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica 1.q83.a1, Fathers of the English Dominican Province, trans (London: Burns Oates & Washbourne, 1911),

[3] David Baggett and Jerry L. Walls, God & Cosmos: Moral Truth and Human Meaning (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2016), 104.

[4] Thomas C. Oden, The Living God: Systematic Theology, Vol. I (San Francisco, CA: HarperSanFrancisco, 1992), 70.

[5] Timothy A. Stratton, Human Freedom, Divine Knowledge, and Mere Molinism: A Biblical, Historical, Theological, and Philosophical Analysis (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2020), 189.

[6] Oden, Living God, 72.

[7] Baggett and Walls, God & Cosmos, 280.

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Lord’s Supper Meditation: Frequency of the Lord’s Supper

A Twilight Musing 

           The minority of Protestant Christians who partake of the Lord’s Supper every Sunday (or more often) have a special obligation to make sure that the frequent observance of this feast does not become commonplace.  It is important, accordingly, that we develop a positive “theology of frequency,” rather than merely excoriating those who disagree with us on the matter.  (By the same token, those who partake of  Communion once a month or less should make sure that they are not neglecting its vital importance in the life of the church.)

           Jesus balanced his caution against vain repetitions in worship by also emphasizing the value of importunity in approaching God.  He praised the Canaanite woman for her persistence in asking for the healing of her daughter, and He told parables (Luke 11 and 18) to show that though God is more than willing to give us what we need, it is part of our spiritual development to keep asking Him.  The Lord’s Supper, like prayer, is a special way of acknowledging our need of what God has to give.  We need to see the incremental value in our frequent remembrance together of God’s greatest gift, His Son, and the resulting life that dwells within us.

           Why does any act become commonplace to us?  Because we develop a tolerance for it or fall into a habitual response to it.  We assume that it will no longer surprise us, and consequently we are not alert to anything fresh that it may have to offer.  But we can never exhaust the possibilities of God’s being able to bless us when we come before Him, and especially must we guard against becoming hardened to the inexhaustible meaning in the bread and wine of the Lord’s Supper.  Even when our weakness gets in the way, God is always there, ready to weave even these unsatisfactory times into the whole fabric of growing His will in us.  For, unlike addiction to physical substances, addiction to God, though it increases in intensity, has no annihilating overdose looming at the end: “We are transfigured into His likeness, from splendor to splendor; such is the influence of the Lord who is Spirit” (II Cor. 3:18, NEB). 

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Dr. Elton Higgs was a faculty member in the English department of the University of Michigan-Dearborn from 1965-2001. Having retired from UM-D as Prof. of English in 2001, he now lives with his wife in Jackson, MI. He has published scholarly articles on Chaucer, Langland, the Pearl Poet, Shakespeare, and Milton. Recently, Dr. Higgs has self-published a collection of his poetry called Probing Eyes: Poems of a Lifetime, 1959-2019, as well as a book inspired by The Screwtape Letters, called The Ichabod Letters, available as an e-book from Moral Apologetics. (Ed.: Dr. Higgs was the most important mentor during undergrad for the creator of this website, and his influence was inestimable.

One Good Reason to Believe in God: The Intrinsic Value of His Image (and Man’s Attempt to Escape It)

Editor’s note: Good Reasons Apologetics has graciously allowed us to republish their series, “One Good Reason” You can find the original post here.

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“Then God said, ‘Let Us make man in Our image, after Our likeness.’” (Gen. 1:26)

Of the 10.7 million Africans who were taken captive and brought to the new world, it is believed about 388,000 ended up in what is now the United States. Congress outlawed bringing slaves into the U.S. in 1808, and yet the population of Africans in the U.S. by 1860 was 4.4 million, 3.9 million of which were slaves, and it was almost entirely the result of natural growth (i.e., babies born into slavery generation after generation).     

According to the Columbia Guide to the Holocaust, almost 6 million Jews were killed in Europe and Russia in just a few years during World War II. This represented about 55% of the population of Jews in the regions. At least 50 million people lost their lives as a direct result of the fighting in World War II, with as many as 85 million who lost their lives in total when things like war related famine and disease are included.

Today in the US, according to the conservative numbers we have, it appears we abort about 850,000 unborn children a year. This has been occurring legally since 1973 thanks to a Supreme Court decision that birthed the idea of the “right” to abort a child. It is now estimated that there have been approximately 42 million unborn Americans aborted.

Many who championed chattel slavery did not view Africans as fully human. The idea of evolution provided racists and eugenicists a way to claim that Africans, Aborigines and other people groups were less evolved, and thus less deserving of life than their more evolved counterparts. Nazi propaganda called Jews “rats” and referred to their homes as “nests.” They systematically exterminated Jews, “invalids” and other groups they called “life unworthy of life.” The most common defense of abortion is that it is not a person, but rather a “clump of cells,” or a “choice.”

The cycle of dehumanizing other humans, followed by murder and genocide and eventually negative historical judgement through time is evidence that man still intuitively recognizes the implicit value in other men, and must overcome the idea his target is fully human before taking life in cold blood.

One might argue that humans enslaving and killing other humans on a large scale is just evolution’s “red in tooth and claw” history playing out as always. However, the overwhelming historical tendency for man’s need to dehumanize other men before enslaving or murdering others seems counter to evolution’s “survival of the fittest.” Shouldn’t it be easier to kill with all this practice?

Anyone who has suffered the loss of a loved one or cried out at the senseless loss of a stranger’s life knows the unexplainable angst that comes from the unjustified or systematic taking of a human life. Does this come from blind, purposeless accidents through time that create the psychological illusion of value in one another based only on mutual advantage as is suggested by some?

It seems far more likely to be the residue of his Creator’s imprint of the value of fellow image bearers on every man’s soul. We dare not kill the King’s sons and daughters, and we know it. 

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Tony Williams is currently serving in his 20th year as a police officer in a city in Southern Illinois. He has been studying apologetics in his spare time for two decades, since a crisis of faith led him to the discovery of vast and ever-increasing evidence for his faith. Tony received a bachelor's degree in University Studies from Southern Illinois University in 2019. His career in law enforcement has provided valuable insight into the concepts of truth, evidence, confession, testimony, cultural competency, morality, and most of all, the compelling need for Christ in the lives of the lost. Tony plans to pursue postgraduate studies in apologetics in the near future to sharpen his understanding of the various facets of Christian apologetics. Tony has been married for 9 years and has two sons. He and his family currently reside in Southern Illinois.