January 10, 2022

The Case That Our Moral Knowledge Points Toward God: Part 4

January 10, 2022/ Zach Breitenbach

INTRODUCTION

This is the fourth and final article in a series on how one might offer several different moral arguments that all (1) focus on our knowledge of moral truth and (2) reinforce each other so that their joint force is even stronger than that of each individual argument.[1] This series of articles has focused specifically on three well-known arguments for God’s existence that have to do with our moral knowledge: the similar arguments of Mark Linville and Alvin Plantinga, an argument by Scott Smith, and an argument put forth by Angus Ritchie. In this article, the series concludes by offering a strategy for how these arguments can be used in conjunction so that they reinforce each other.

A CUMULATIVE CASE MORAL KNOWLEDGE ARGUMENT

Although there are differences between each of the moral knowledge arguments described in this article, there are also many similarities; moreover, the differences are not such that the Christian moral apologist must choose one to the exclusion of the others. Instead, these versions are complementary and can be used in conjunction to make an even stronger moral argument for God’s existence—one that is sturdier than any one of these versions by itself. In this final section, we will consider how these different arguments may be used in combination and explore a strategy for making this work. To accomplish this, it is helpful to begin by comparing and contrasting these views before integrating them into a cumulative argument.

It is clear that Plantinga and Smith make the most ambitious claim, as they argue that there is reason to doubt that we could have any knowledge at all in a naturalistic world. Nevertheless, Plantinga and Smith make their cases entirely differently, since Plantinga argues that the evolutionary aspect of naturalism provides a defeater for moral knowledge and Smith attempts to show that the physicalist aspect of naturalism removes any basis for the personhood and mental states that would be needed for knowledge. Linville’s point is somewhat less bold, arguing that on naturalism we have a defeater for moral knowledge but not other types of knowledge. In doing so, his approach is more similar to Plantinga’s than Smith’s in terms of arguing that the evolutionary aspect of naturalism undermines knowledge; however, unlike both Plantinga and Smith, Linville does not deny that all knowledge is undermined on naturalism. Ritchie’s claim is the least ambitious, since he grants that moral knowledge is possible even on naturalism. Ritchie takes moral knowledge as a fact that requires explanation and makes the more modest claim that naturalism cannot adequately explain moral knowledge. In terms of how he goes about this, we have seen that his approach is more similar to that of Plantinga and Linville than to that of Smith, as Ritchie’s focus is on the evolutionary aspect of naturalism.

With these differences and similarities in mind, let us now consider how to integrate them into a cumulative moral argument. It is reasonable to begin with the most ambitious claims first. The arguments of both Plantinga and Smith lend themselves well to being the first line of argumentation for two reasons. First, if successful, they raise the sharpest challenge against naturalism by providing a defeater for all knowledge on naturalism. The naturalist who sees the force of either—or both—of these arguments thus has reason to doubt whether naturalism can be rationally affirmed; moreover, if the naturalist finds either of these arguments to be sound and also finds it plausible that we do have knowledge in the actual world, then he has good reason to doubt the truth of naturalism. Second, there is the advantage that these two arguments have an entirely different focus. If the moral apologist’s secular interlocuter is unconvinced by one of them, that does not weaken the force of the other; thus, using these two arguments as the first line of argumentation has an initial cumulative benefit.

Linville’s argument can be used next in order to make a more modest case in the event that the unbeliever sees merit in Plantinga’s argument but finds it implausible that all knowledge would be undermined on evolutionary naturalism. As we have seen, Plantinga rightly contends that it is irrelevant to his argument whether we seem to have knowledge in the actual world, and he argues persuasively that there is no reason to think that adaptive behavior requires the truthfulness of any of our beliefs; however, some may find it more plausible that holding true beliefs would provide a survival advantage. It is at this juncture that Linville’s more modest approach can be used, as he differentiates between moral and nonmoral beliefs by allowing that holding true nonmoral beliefs will often provide a survival advantage whereas the truthfulness of moral beliefs does not seem to provide a survival advantage. Linville makes a good case for why it is not arbitrary to exclude moral knowledge on naturalism even if one allows other knowledge.

If the skeptic of theism is still unconvinced and simply finds it unreasonable to doubt that we would have moral knowledge on naturalism, one can utilize Ritchie’s even more modest argument. Even if the defender of our cumulative moral knowledge argument does not agree with Ritchie that moral knowledge is justified on naturalism, one can grant this for the sake of argument and make the case along with Ritchie that naturalism cannot adequately explain how we have this knowledge. The moral apologist can defend Ritchie’s claim that any viable worldview must be able to explain moral knowledge and point out that Ritchie himself even goes so far as to accept that our nonmoral beliefs can be not only justified but explained by natural selection on naturalism. Ritchie’s dilemma can then be posed to the skeptic to show the difficulty of explaining moral knowledge on naturalism. If the skeptic recognizes that there is no evolutionary advantage to some of our moral beliefs, then she should be able to see that naturalism cannot explain those moral beliefs; however, if she claims that all of our moral beliefs do carry an evolutionary advantage then she faces the problem that some actions that are favorable for the survival and effective replication of the human species seem to be immoral (e.g., killing the weak, disabled, and diseased; mandating rape if the only women left on earth refused to procreate).

In this way, all of these arguments are complementary and fit nicely into a cumulative case strategy. For both apologetic and moral reasons, one does not want a naturalist to give up on thinking that there is objective moral truth or to hold onto her naturalism while abandoning her belief that she has genuine moral knowledge. It is therefore critical when making this case to encourage her to give up naturalism and not give up on moral knowledge. The intent of this cumulative moral argument is to show that naturalism cannot adequately justify—or at least explain—moral knowledge. This can in turn be used as part of an even broader cumulative moral argument that seeks to show that naturalism cannot justify other aspects of morality, such as the existence of objective moral values and duties, moral transformation, and moral rationality.

1. These articles are adapted for a popular audience from an article that I published in the Journal of the International Society of Christian Apologetics (Volume 12, 2019, pp. 49-64) that is titled “Toward a Cumulative Epistemic Moral Argument for God’s Existence.”

December 27, 2021

The Case That Our Moral Knowledge Points Toward God: Part 2

December 27, 2021/ Zach Breitenbach

This is the second article in a series on how one might offer several different moral arguments that all (1) focus on our knowledge of moral truth and (2) reinforce each other so that their joint force is even stronger than that of each individual argument.[1] This series of articles focuses specifically on three well-known arguments for God’s existence that have to do with our moral knowledge. After examining each argument, the series will conclude by offering a strategy for how they can be used in conjunction so that they reinforce each other. Last time we examined the similar (but different) arguments given by Mark Linville and Alvin Plantinga concerning evolutionary naturalism (EN). Now we will inspect an argument from Scott Smith.

SCOTT SMITH’S ARGUMENT

Like Plantinga, Smith concludes that we would have no knowledge—moral or otherwise—if naturalism were true, but Smith arrives at this conclusion quite differently. Instead of arguing that EN would give us a defeater for all of our knowledge because we would have evolved for adaptive behavior rather than holding true beliefs, Smith focuses on the fact that naturalism eliminates any basis for humans having an immaterial essence, or soul, that can allow for genuine mental events—intentional thoughts “of” or “about” things in the world. If a human person is only a physical brain that receives and processes inputs, then Smith argues that such intentionality is impossible. This, he believes, unavoidably undermines any basis for us having knowledge. Let us examine Smith’s view more closely.

Smith makes his case largely by laying out some key implications that the atheist Daniel Dennett believes follow from naturalism, since Smith believes much of Dennett’s perspective is an accurate representation of what would be true in a naturalistic world. Smith perceives Dennett as one of the few philosophers of science working in cognitive science who takes seriously “the implications of naturalism—and naturalistic evolution.”[2] Dennett denies that there is an enduring self (a “you” that continues to exist over time); instead, the brain has been shaped by evolution to give us the illusion that there is a self and that the self has mental content such as “beliefs, desires, fears, and hopes.” Humans are just biological machines and have no intentionality, but we have come to regard ourselves and others as intentional agents because it is useful for predicting behavior.[3] Just as this allows us to predict what a “chess-playing computer will do,” it is efficient for us to view humans and animals in the same way and attribute intentionality to them; however, in reality, there is no such intentionality. We live in a physical world with no metaphysical persons who have real intentional states, so we do not really think “of or about something.”[4]

Dennett admits that genuine mental states must be “of” or “about” some particular thing. One cannot have a thought or experience that is not about something. This “ofness” or “intentionality” is essential to every mental state. A thought about a particular thing (e.g., a cat) could not be about something else (e.g., a dog) and “still be the thought that it is.” Dennett recognizes that true mental states must be nonphysical in nature in order to be “of their intended objects.” Since Dennett realizes that naturalism leaves no room for nonphysical essences, Smith agrees with Dennett that naturalism merely allows us to “take (interpret, conceive) a mental state to be about something.”[5] But Smith argues that this does not constitute knowledge, as the “denial of the existence of essences results in our inability to have knowledge.”[6] Naturalism requires that mental states must be “reduced to physical stuff or denied.” Since our mental states have no essence and no “ofness,” our “experiences” are merely “the last state in a long, causal, physical chain.” But this means we can never get past experiencing our “last physical state” so as to know whether we are perceiving the object of our experience as it is. Only if mental states are nonphysical can they “escape the physical limitations of causal chains.”[7] Natural selection entails that our thoughts are no different from a computer program. A computer’s intentionality is not original but is derived from its programmer, and any intentionality (“ofness” or “aboutness”) that we have in our thinking is similarly derived from natural selection.[8] Although our mental states, sense of self, and moral beliefs seem evident to us, these things would not have any basis in reality. In terms of morality, “evil” merely becomes our “interpretations of physical events.” There are no “intrinsically mental (or moral) entities” that could have a “good or bad quality” or an “essence.”[9] For there to be objective moral truths that we can know, there would have to be “essences involved both in our mental states, the moral principles and virtues, and in persons.”[10]

Smith also emphasizes that the “self must somehow remain essentially the same through time and change, such that the identical person owns these thoughts and experiences, grows in understanding and learning, even if over a span of many years.”[11] Smith thus thinks that the reality of the soul, which clearly is beyond the resources of naturalism, is essential to us having knowledge. It is problematic if “I” am not an enduring self with true mental properties and if there are no essences for me to know. But with naturalism, the most we can do is merely attribute moral motivations to others while the actual processes going on in the human machine are purely physical and lack intentionality.[12]

Smith rightly points out that Dennett’s claim that we attribute intentionality to others is problematic. This is because one would seem to require real thoughts and intentional beliefs that are “about” or “of” another person in order to attribute intentionality to that person. Although Dennett does claim we can know things, his view undermines any basis for knowledge because our brain merely receives inputs and processes them. So, Dennett fails to realize that without any basis for intentionality and the self, it is self-refuting for him to claim true knowledge of his theory or of anything else.[13] We can never have a “conscious awareness” of reality as it is; ultimately, “everything is interpretation all the way down.”[14] Smith thus takes the firm position that “naturalism cannot give us knowledge.” This means that “all the various naturalists’ proposals for ethics also must fail due to their inability to offer any knowledge.”[15]

Smith’s argument has much force. He is surely correct that the mental events necessary for knowledge are different from physical events because physical events are not about anything.[16] A soul seems necessary in order for human persons to be more than biological machines that simply process inputs and produce mechanistic outputs. If mental events are nonphysical, as they seemingly must be, then it is hard to see how purely physical things could have them. Having surveyed Smith’s view, next time we will consider one final argument concerning moral knowledge.

Part 1

Part 3

Part 4

2. R. Scott Smith, In Search of Moral Knowledge: Overcoming the Fact-Value Dichotomy (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2014), 137.

3. Ibid., 138-139. This idea of viewing ourselves and others as intentional, rational agents allows us to predict behavior, and Dennett calls it the “intentional stance.” This concept is laid out by Dennett in his book by the same name. See: Daniel Clement Dennett, The Intentional Stance (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987).

4. Ibid., 140-142.

5. Ibid., 293.

6. Ibid., 294.

7. Ibid., 303.

8. Ibid., 143.

9. Ibid., 145.

10. Ibid., 322.

11. Ibid., 309-310.

12. Ibid., 146.

13. Ibid., 147-151.

14. Ibid., 151.

15. Ibid., 153.

16. J. P. Moreland has highlighted many other evidences that mental and physical events are not identical. These include: mental events, unlike physical events, are known and experienced only by the person having them; mental events, unlike physical events, have no parts; only mental events can be vague or pleasurable; one only has direct access to one’s mental states but physical states can be accessed by multiple people; and mental states, unlike the physical, are necessarily owned by a specific person. See: James Porter Moreland, The Soul: How We Know It's Real and Why It Matters (Chicago, IL: Moody Publishers, 2014) 80-81.

November 09, 2020

Making Sense of Morality: Introduction

November 09, 2020/ R. Scott Smith

Editor’s note: R. Scott Smith has graciously allowed us to republish his series, “Making Sense of Morality.” You can find the original post here.

Our Moral Landscape

Today, in the west, we live in a time with many different moral “voices” and competing claims. When I was a graduate student in Religion and Social Ethics at the University of Southern California from 1995-2000, this was quickly apparent. Many of my fellow grad students rejected any kind of objectively real morals. Instead, they saw morals as their own construct, which were based on a wide range of preferred views. One person, a Reformed Jew, tried to integrate her religious tradition with the insights of Jacques Derrida’s deconstructionism and the sociology of knowledge. Many rejected their Catholic roots and instead embraced some form of critical theory, which is deeply liberationist in spirit. Some followed Foucault and queer theory, while others embraced Nietzsche. Still others followed various feminist theorists.

Like them, many people think morality is simply “up to us”; morals are just particular to individuals or communities. Indeed, they are deeply suspicious of any claims that there are morals that transcend and exist independently of us. They think that to impose others’ morals, including “objective” ones, on people is deeply imperialistic and oppressive. After all, who are you to say what is right or wrong?

There also are different social visions that align with these moral viewpoints. For example, progressives seem to be secular, such that morals for society should be based on secular, public reasons, not narrow, sectarian, or religious reasons. Otherwise, how could we come together and be a society in which there are so many different, private moral visions?

Shaping Influences

Now, for those influenced by western thought, and especially those who have grown up in the west, it easily can seem that not only is this moral diversity the way things are, but also the way things should be. After all, in the west (and especially the U. S.), we prize the value of autonomy, which we understand as being free to determine our own lives. Coupled with the view that morals are basically “up to us,” we should expect there to be an irreducible plurality of viewpoints, norms, and values.

Over time, in the west a large number of competing moral theories have been advanced. But these did not come out of a vacuum. They have a history with many shaping influences, leading even to the mindset that morals are up to us. One of the things I will do in this series is to explore those shaping factors. Two of them are the Scientific Revolution, and the “fact-value split” in the late 1700s.

Core Morals

Despite this great plurality of ethical views, it still seems there are at least some core morals all people simply know to be valid. For instance, people want justice to be done. They may disagree about what constitutes justice, or their theories about justice. But, it seems people know that justice is good and should be done. Love is another virtue people know to be good. They may disagree about what the loving action should be, but they still seem to agree that we should be loving.

Besides these virtues, there are some principles that people simply seem to know are right. For instance, it seems people simply know murder is wrong. While some may disagree about what act should count as murder, nevertheless, we know that murder (as the intentional taking of an innocent person’s life) is wrong. I would add that rape is wrong too. These four morals seem to be core –we simply seem to know they are valid.

Some might add other moral principles and values to that short list. For example, for many, it is clear that genocide and chattel slavery are wrong. In this series, I will focus on those four core morals. I will look at the various types of ethical views in western historical context, to see if they can preserve those core morals. If a theory cannot do that, then it seems we should reject it. In that process, a key question I will ask is this: what kind of thing are these core morals? But, before I start that survey, I will explore the influences from the Scientific Revolution on our ethical thinking.

R. Scott Smith is a Christian philosopher and apologist, with special interests in ethics, knowledge, and seeing the body of Christ live in the fullness of the Spirit and truth.

October 12, 2014

EPS Interview with R. Scott Smith: In Search of Moral Knowledge

October 12, 2014/ Managing Editor

One of the variants of moral apologetics is epistemic. Angus Ritchie’s From Morality to Metaphysics is one example; Mark Linville’s excellent work is another. Another is R. Scott Smith’s excellent recent book called In Search of Moral Knowledge. Here is an interview of him conducted by Joe Gorra and the Evangelical Philosophical Society.